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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

\7"
V.

'
i

MICHAEL S. WEAVER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20070136-CA

:

JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from his sentence for possession of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person, a third degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Can defendant demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel where his
claim rests solely on vague and unsubstantiated allegations made in a
post-judgment letter to the trial court?
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal is

reviewed as a question of law. See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ^ 6, 89 P.3d 162.
STATUTES AND RULES
The following relevant statutes and court rules are attached at Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (West 2004);
Utah Code Arm. § 77-18-1 (West Supp. 2006).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
AND
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
On or about April 1, 2005, two police officers were dispatched to defendant's
residence to execute an arrest warrant (R. 39-40; R. 2041 (PSI at 6)). The defendant was
in his vehicle; his four-year-old son was in the back seat (R. 40; R. 2041 (PSI at 6)). One
of the officers removed the child from defendant's vehicle (R. 2041 (PSI at 6)). Although
defendant remained uncooperative, he was eventually moved into the other officer's
vehicle (Id). In a subsequent search of defendant's vehicle, officers found a glass pipe
and a plastic container with white powder in a jacket next to where the child had been
sitting (R. 39-40; R. 2041 (PSI at 6)). Both the pipe and powder tested positive for
methamphetamine (R. 40; R. 2041 (PSI at 6)). In a fanny pack in the front area of the
vehicle, the officers found another glass pipe and a sharp kitchen knife (R. 39-40; R. 2041
(PSI at 6)). Defendant had previously been convicted of a violent felony (R. 40).
Defendant was charged by amended information with unlawful possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine), a second degree felony; endangerment of a
child, a third degree felony; possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a
third degree felony; and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B

]

Because defendant's conviction was based on a guilty plea, not a trial, the facts of
the case are taken from the Information and defendant's presentence investigation report
(PSI).
2

misdemeanor (R. 38-40). Defendant waived a preliminary hearing and was bound over
on all charges (R. 41-43).
Pursuant to a plea bargain covering multiple criminal cases against him, defendant
pleaded guilty to four charges, including the possession of a dangerous weapon charge in
this case (R. 152, 154-60). The remaining charges against defendant were dismissed
(Id).2
A sentencing hearing in this case was held on January 12, 2007 (R. 207 (transcript
attached at Addendum B)). At the beginning of the hearing, defense counsel presented
the court with letters from defendant's work and sister (R. 207:37). The court then heard
from defense counsel, defendant, and a mental health counselor with whom defendant
had been working, all of whom argued for leniency for defendant (R. 207:37-58). Neither

2

In addition to the charges in this case, the plea agreement covered charges in three
other cases. In case 051907570, defendant was charged with two counts of unlawful
possession of a financial card, a third degree felony; and one count each of burglary, a
second degree felony; unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a second degree
felony; forgery, a third degree felony; possession of another's ID documents, a third
degree felony; and unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a class B misdemeanor
(R. 2041 (PSI at 5)). Pursuant to the plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to the forgery
and burglary charges, and the remaining charges were dismissed (Id.).
In case 051907618, defendant was charged with assault by a prisoner, a third
degree felony, and attempted damage to jails, a class A misdemeanor (Id.) Pursuant to the
plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to the assault by a prisoner charge, and the
remaining charge was dismissed (Id. at 6).
In case 051903146, defendant was charged with retail theft, a third degree felony,
and driving without insurance, a class B misdemeanor (Id. at 5). Pursuant to the plea
agreement, these charges were dismissed (Id.).
3

defendant nor his counsel, however, objected to defendant's PSI or claimed that
inaccuracies existed therein (Id).
On January 16, 2007, the trial court entered a final judgment sentencing defendant
to the statutory term of 0-to-5 years on the weapons charge (R. 164-65). The court
ordered that defendant's sentence run consecutive to his sentences in the other cases (Id.).
On January 22, 2007, the trial court received a letter from defendant claiming that
his presentence investigation report "is full of errors and very negative which I asked [my
defense counsel] to address but never happened" (R. 166).
On February 8, 2007, defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal (R. 169). Following
a temporary remand by this Court, new defense counsel was appointed (R. 203).
Before filing his opening brief, defendant moved this Court for a remand under
Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to establish facts necessary to support an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim (Def. Rule 23B Motion) (attached at Addendum
C)). The State opposed defendant's motion on the ground that it was based solely by
unsworn allegations in a docketing statement, and, thus, failed to allege any specific
nonspeculative facts warranting a remand (State's Response to Rule 23B Motion
(attached at Addendum C)). This Court denied the motion, stating that defendant had
"not alleged specific nonspeculative facts warranting remand" (Order dated October 9,
2007 (attached at Addendum C)).

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that his defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance at
sentencing by failing to raise inaccuracies in defendant's presentence investigation report
(PSI). Defendant's claim fails for lack of record support.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show
both that his counsel performed deficiently and that he was prejudiced by counsel's
deficient performance. The claim must allege specific acts or omissions by counsel that
were deficient and prejudicial. The claim cannot be based on unsubstantiated or
speculative allegations.
Here, the only record evidence supporting defendant's claim is a post-judgment
letter to the trial court in which defendant alleges inaccuracies in his PSI and claims to
have asked his counsel to raise those inaccuracies at sentencing. Defendant's letter,
however, fails to identify any specific inaccuracies in the PSI. It also fails to present any
evidence, other than defendant's self-serving allegation, that defense counsel was aware
of those alleged inaccuracies prior to sentencing. The letter's allegations, therefore, are
both vague and unsubstantiated. As such, they do not support an ineffective assistance
claim. Thus, defendant's claim fails.

5

ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT CANNOT DEMONSTRATE INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHERE HIS CLAIM RESTS SOLELY
ON VAGUE AND UNSUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATIONS MADE IN
A POST-JUDGMENT LETTER TO THE TRIAL COURT
Defendant claims that his trial counsel "performed ineffectively in failing to bring
errors in the presentence report to the attention of the trial court." Aplt. Br. at 5
(capitalization and underlining omitted). According to defendant, "counsel performed
deficiently because, on behalf of her client, she did not bring errors in the presentence
report [] to the trial court's attention." Id. And, according to defendant, counsel's
performance was prejudicial because it is "possible that resolution of the inaccuracies in
his presentence investigation report could have led to different, and more favorable,
sentencing terms." Id. at 7. Defendant's claim fails because the record is inadequate to
support it.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant must show both
that "counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgement," and that "counsel's deficient performance was
prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT
76, f 19, 12 P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)).
To establish the first prong of the Stricklandlest, defendant must identify the "specific
acts or omissions of counsel" that he claims "fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness." State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9, ^ 45, 154 P.3d 788. He must then "rebut
6

the strong presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Powell, 2007 UT 9, ^f 46. To establish the second
prong, defendant must affirmatively show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." Powell, 2007 UT 9, f 45 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). In all cases,
"proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a
demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993); see also State
v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1998) ("Neither speculative claims nor counsel's failure
to make futile objections establishes ineffective assistance of counsel").
Moreover, in any ineffectiveness claim, "defendant bears the burden of assuring
the record is adequate." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 16. Thus, "[i]f a defendant is aware
of any 'nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal,
which, if true, could support a determination that counsel was ineffective,' Utah R. App.
P. 23B, defendant bears the primary obligation and burden of moving for a temporary
remand." Id. "The necessary consequence of this burden is that an appellate court will
presume that any argument of ineffectiveness presented to it is supported by all the
relevant evidence of which defendant is aware." Id.dX\\l.

"Where the record appears

inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be
construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively." Id.

1

In this case, defendant's claim rests on his contention that he "told his trial counsel
about factual errors or omissions in his presentence report" prior to sentencing and that
his counsel "failed to bring those errors to the attention of the trial court." Aplt. Br. at 4.
However, the only support for defendant's contention is a post-judgment letter he sent to
the trial court, id. at 3 (citing R. 166), and a docketing statement filed in a different
appellate case, id. at 2 & Addendum D (citing docketing statement filed in case no.
20070158-CA). Those documents are insufficient to prevail on an ineffective assistance
claim.
First, defendant's self-serving letter to the trial court states only that "the Pre
Sentence report is full of errors and very negative which I asked [defense counsel] to
address but never happened" (R. 166). The letter neither identifies with any specificity
the exact nature of the errors alleged, nor establishes as a matter of fact that defendant
informed defense counsel of those errors before sentencing. Moreover, because the
assertions in the letter were not given under oath or tested in cross-examination, they are
not evidence. The letter, therefore, does not support an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. See State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987) (rejecting ineffective
assistance claim "based almost entirely on self-serving affidavits that are not part of the
record"); State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 290 (Utah App. 1998) (holding that defendant
"cannot rely upon . . . unsubstantiated allegations on appeal as proof of ineffective

8

assistance of counsel"); State v. Price, 909 P.2d 256, 265 (Utah App. 1995) (rejecting
ineffectiveness claim based solely on "defendant's self-serving statement").
Second, although defendant cites a docketing statement and attaches the docketing
statement to his brief, see Aplt. Br. at 2 & Addendum D, the docketing statement was
filed in a different appellate case and, in any case, is not part of the record on appeal. See
Aplt. Br. at Addendum D (indicating docketing statement was filed in case number
20070158-CA). Thus, defendant's reliance on it is misplaced. See Medina, 738 P.2d at
1023 (noting that "references to matters outside the record will not be considered" on
appeal") (citing State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986)); Bredehoft, 966 P.2d at
290 (holding that appellate court "do[es] not consider new evidence on appeal").
Furthermore, the docketing statement only alleges that the PSI is "not accurate and
very bias" because it did not contain information concerning his alleged conversation
with an Adult Probation and Parole officer or his alleged rehabilitation efforts. Aplt. Br.
at Addendum D. Like the letter defendant wrote to the trial court, however, the
allegations in the docketing statement are both vague and unsubstantiated. See id. Those
vague and unsubstantiated allegations were insufficient to warrant a rule 23B in this case.
See Order dated October 9, 2007 (denying defendant's rule 23B remand based on
allegations in same docketing statement because defendant had "not alleged specific
nonspeculative facts warranting a remand"). They are also insufficient to support an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Medina, 738 P.2d at 1023; Bredehoft, 966

9

P.2d at 290; Price, 909 P.2d at 265; see also Fernandez, 870 P.2d at 877; Chacon, 962
P.2dat51.
Finally, as a matter of clarification, the State notes that defendant cites a prior case
involving him as a defendant in which the State conceded that a remand was required to
address alleged inaccuracies in a PSI. See Aplt. Br. at 7-8 (citing State v. Weaver, 2007
UT App 229U). That case, however, both preceded all of the four cases resolved by
defendant's current pleas and involved a different PSI. See Weaver, 2007 UT App 229U
(attached at Addendum D); see also Aple. Br. in case no. 20060482-CA (attached at
Addendum D). Thus, a remand in that case in no way supports a similar remand in this
case.
Consequently, defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully asks this Court to affirm defendant's
sentence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED (J_ February 2008.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

KAREN A. KLUCZNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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Addenda

Addendum A

5 7 6 - 1 0 - 5 0 3 . Restrictions on possession, purchase, transfer, and ownership of dangerous weapons by certain persons
(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) A Category I restricted person is a person who:
(i) has been convicted of any violent felony as defined in Section
76-3-203.5;
(ii) is on probation or parole for any felony;
(iii) is on parole from a secure facility as defined in Section 62A-7-101;
or
(iv) within the last ten years has been adjudicated delinquent for an
offense which if committed by an adult would have been a violent felony as
defined in Section 76-3-203.5.
(b) A Category II restricted person is a person who:
(i) has been convicted of or is under indictment for any felony;
(ii) within the last seven years has been adjudicated delinquent for an
offense which if committed by an adult would have been a felony;
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in Section
58-37-2;
(iv) is in possession of a dangerous weapon and is knowingly and
intentionally in unlawful possession of a Schedule I or II controlled
substance as defined in Section 58-37-2;
(v) has been found not guilty by reason of insanity for a felony offense;
(vi) has been found mentally incompetent to stand trial for a felony
offense;
(vii) has been adjudicated as mentally defective as provided in the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536
(1993),1 or has been committed to a mental institution;
(viii) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States;
(ix) has been dishonorably discharged from the armed forces; or1
(x) has renounced his citizenship after having been a citizen of the
United States.
(2) A Category I restricted person who intentionally or knowingly agrees,
consents, offers, or arranges to purchase, transfer, possess, u!$e, or have under
his custody or control, or who intentionally or knowingly purchases, transfers,
possesses, uses, or has under his custody or control:
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a third degree
felony.
(3) A Category II restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses,
or has under his custody or control:
(a) any firearm is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
(4) A person may be subject to the restrictions of both categories at the same
time.
(5) If a higher penalty than is prescribed in this section is provided in
another section for one who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under

§ 77-18-1. Suspension of sentence—Pleas held in abeyance—Probation—Supervision—Presentence investigation—Standards—Confidentiality—Terms
and conditions—Termination, revocation, modification, or extension—
Hearings—Electronic monitoring
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with a plea in
abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided in Title 77, Chapter
2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement.
(2)(a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of any crime or
offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence and
place the defendant on probation. The court may place the defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in
cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.
(b)(i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the department is
with the department.
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court
is vested as ordered by the court.
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(3)(a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards
for all individuals referred to the department These standards shall be based on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the demand for services;
(iii) the availability of agency resources;
(iv) the public safety; and
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level of services
shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial
Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for review and comment
prior to adoption by the department.
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to implement the
supervision and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications to the
standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and other criteria as they consider
appropriate.
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact report and
submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee.
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to supervise
the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions or to' cqnduct
presentence investigation reports on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the
department may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with
department standards.

(5)(a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of the
defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of time for
the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report from the department or information from other sources about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the effect of the crime on the victim
and the victim's family.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary
damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding the payment
of restitution with interest by the defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a,
Crime Victims Restitution Act.
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any diagnostic
evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, are protected and are not
available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the
Judicial Council or for use by the department.
(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the defendant's
attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and the court for
review, three working days prior to sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence
investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to
sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may
grant an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the
department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall
make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the record.
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at
the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or information
the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate
sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall be presented in open court on record
and in the presence of the defendant.
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may require that the
defendant:
(a) perform any or all of the following:
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being placed on
probation;
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs;
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally liable;
(iv) participate in available treatment programs, including any treatment program in
which the defendant is currently participating, if the program is acceptable to^he court;
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail designated by the
department, after considering any recommendation by the court as to which jail the court
finds most appropriate;
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of eledtronic
monitoring;
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7;
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services;
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest in accordance
with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; and
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate; and
(b) if convicted on or after May 5,1997:
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a GED
certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's own expense if the defendant has
not received the diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being placed
on probation; or
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items listed in
Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of:

(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or
(B) other justified cause.
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as defined by Section
76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during:
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with Subsection
77-27-6(4); and
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised probation and
any extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection (10).
(10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or upon
completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases,
or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions.
(ii)(A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under Subsection
(10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account receivable as defined in
Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case "and continue the
defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the
account receivable.
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the registry of civil
judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and immediately transfer responsibility to collect the account to the Office of State Debt Collection,
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, or upon its
own motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his failure to pay
should not be treated as contempt of court.
(b)(i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State Debt
Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination
of supervised probation will occur by law.
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report of
details on outstanding accounts receivable.
(ll)(a)(i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having been
charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke probation does not
constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning revoca-*
tion of probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term
unless the probationer is exonerated at the hearing,
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation report with
the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the issuance
of an order to show cause or warrant by the court.
(12)(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing by
the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the probationer has violated the
conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a iinamg mat
the conditions of probation have been violated.
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to constitute
violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized probation shall determine
if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or
extension of probation is justified.
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on the
defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order to show cause
why his probation should not be revoked, modified, or extended.
(c)(i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing and shall be
served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing,
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be represented
by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if he is indigent,
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present evidence.

(d)(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of the affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney
shall present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are
based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant unless the
court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and present
evidence.
(e)(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact.
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court
may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire probation term
commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the s'efitence previously imposed shall be executed.
, (13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of the Division of
Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a condition
of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or
his designee has certified to the court that:
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the state hospital;
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for treatment
over the defendants described in this Subsection (13).
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic evaluations, are
classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and
Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records
Committee may not order the disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for
disclosure at the time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the
presentence investigation only when:
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7);
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the department
for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of the offender;
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole;
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the subject's
authorized representative; or
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence investigation report
or the victim's authorized representative, provided that the disclosure to the victim shall
include only information relating to statements or materials provided by the victim* to the
circumstances of the crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the
crime on the victim or the victim's household.
(15)(a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation under the
supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5.
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home confinement,
including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to the department in accordance
with Subsection (16).
(16)(a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it may order the
defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring as
described in this section until further order of the court.
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate law
enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts.
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require:
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; and
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the defendant's
compliance with the court's order may be monitored.
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement through electronic
monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, it shall:

(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Department of
Corrections;
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the defendant
and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the defendant; and
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confinement to the
department or the program provider.
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to be indigent by the court.
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this section either
directly or by contract with a private provider.
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2

JUDGE DENO HIMONAS PRESIDING

3

For the Plaintiff:

MICHAEL P. THOMAS

4

For the Defendant:

BRENDA M. VIERA

5

P R O C E E D I N G S

6

THE COURT: Are we ready?

7

MS. VIERA: We're ready, Your Honor.

8

THE COURT: Mr. Weaver?

9

DEFENDANT: Well, yes, sir.

10

MS. VIERA: Your Honor, I do have two letters.

One

11

from Mr. Weaver's work and the other from his sister, if I

12

may approach?

13
14

THE COURT: Absolutely.

You've also had a chance to

review the Pre-Sentence Report?

15

MS. VIERA: Yes, Your Honor.

16

THE COURT: Go ahead.

17

MS. VIERA: Your Honor, Dr. Deuso is also here and

18

would like to speak with the Court regarding Mr. Weaver as

19

well.

20

Your Honor, the recommendation of AP&P I think is

21

not unexpected.

Before Mr. Weaver entered his plea I had

22

talked with AP&P and spoke with Troy Staker, Mr. Weaver's

23

probation agent, regarding Mr. Weaver and what AP&P was

24

likely to do.

At that time he had informed me that he was

25 J more geared toward rehabilitation and unfortunately, I think,
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1

Mr. Weaver's past is something that he felt that he could not

2

overlook.

3

Mr. Weaver, however, cannot wipe out his past and

4

he certainly cannot change how he was raised and the paths

5

that led him to where he is today. What he can do, Your

6

Honor, is simply change what he's currently doing and what he

7

can be in the future.

8

he has been working toward doing that.

9

is, but he is now 52 years old, and since 2002 he has

And in the past, at least, three years
His record is what it

10

successfully completed probation.

11

two years and successfully completed that, and since 2005 he

12

has been clean.

13

(inaudible) with the Court compliant and coming to Court is

14

required in (inaudible) of his cases, and further, that he

15

has been on probation now with AP&P on the matter in Davis

16

County without violation.

17

He went on probation for

He hasn't had any new crimes, and he has

He has - his current history and what he's been

18

(inaudible) shows three things which presented Mr. Weaver to

19

be successful and that is that he had a goal in mind, he had

20

a focus that he wanted to get to and he had supervision. His

21

goal has been, and I think you know this very well, his

22

children.

23

him after being abandoned by their mother, and he has worked

24

very hard to maintain his ability to father them.

He has two small children that were placed with

He hasn't

25 I been successful in all ways, he has been extremely successful
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1

in others.

2

them.

3

the ability to parent them and he has been granted that

4

ability to parent them (inaudible) time.

5

current goals/focus.

6

He loves his children. He wants what's best for

He's worked with DCFS, sometimes successfully, to get

That is now his

In August of 2005 - 2006, his right to parent his

7

children was terminated.

He is now working to, on an appeal

8

to try and get those children back.

9

ultimately be successful of that will be up to another court.

Whether or not he will

10

But as things stand now, that still remains his goal and his

11

focus, and I believe that that is what will get him the

12

ability to succeed.

13

he needs to become, quite frankly, someone better than he was

14

before.

15

been working toward.

16

has been out and the past 15 months when these cases have

17

been pending is to attend, on his own initiative, and without

18

cost based upon services that he provides in repayment for

19

the treatment that he receives from Dr. Deuso.

20

him regularly, has a very important mainstay in his life, has

21

a very important (inaudible) for him when he becomes

22

(inaudible) trouble.

23
24

What it will give him is the time that

And in the past three years, that is what he has
What he has done in the time that he

He goes to

He has repeatedly come to my office asking me,
again, is there anything more that I can do, is there

2 5 J anything more that I can show to prove that I can be
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1

successful, to prove to you, Judge Himonas, that he will be a

2

better person than he has been before.

3

focuses that have kept him going the past 15 months.

4

come to Court knowing what he was charged with, knowing the

5

likely consequences of what would happen to him and he has

6

always come to Court, he has always done what was required of

7

him and he has always done what he said he would do.

8

think, has been the most impressive thing about him in regard

9

to my feelings with him.

10

And those are the
He has

That, I

He has in a time received treatment for the drug

11

problem.

12

He's been compliant with the, all court and lawyer requests.

13

He is focused on what he needs to do with this Court, with

14

the juvenile court, with the juvenile judge, with the court

15

in Davis County and also with my request upon him as to what

16

he needed to do to make sure that he stayed out, stayed clean

17

and stayed compliant.

18

He's received treatment for his behavioral issues.

Ultimately, what we have been trying to accomplish

19

in a very short period of time is his rehabilitation.

Mr.

20

Weaver has been in and out of prison since he was, quite

21

frankly 12 years old.

22

custody and in 1994 was the termination of his last prison

23

commitment.

24

out of prison.

He went to 12 years old into State

From that time, 12 years ago, he has remained
He hasn't been without crimes during that

25 I time and we're here because of that.

But what he has done is
40

1

tried to, tried to become a different person.

And the reason

2

that he did this, the ability to do this I think was, quite

3

frankly, a consequence, a devastating consequence to him of

4

losing his children. Mr. Weaver is not ever going to be

5

completely rehabilitated. He, quite frankly, has been a long-

6

term career criminal for all, most all of his life.

7

happened when he was left home at the age of 10 and was in

8

the court system by the age of 12.

9

has been out this most recently and from 2002, he has

It

But in the time that he

10

accomplished a great deal to overcome a substantial time

11

period and substantial deficit in his criminal thinking, in

12

his lack of taking responsibility and in his avoidance of

13

problems, his impulsive - impulsivity, which is a great deal

14

of his criminal behavior and thinking.

15

isn't worked through time, he's not ever going to be, his

16

first impulse isn't ever going to be the right one, but what

17

it will do is give him the time to pause, to think and to

18

think about the consequences of his actions on other people,

19

and that is something that he has been successfully thinking

20

of within the past three years. That's something that he

21

worked with Dr. Deuso on and something that I've been trying

22

to get him to understand, to see, especially as he's taking

23

responsibilities for these crimes.

24
25

That's something that

So, Mr. Weaver is now 50 years old and struggling
to leave behind an extensive history, an extensive upbringing
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1

that has from that time to now worked against him but he has

2

now the resources that he needs to be successful.

3

invests a great deal of time in his failures and his past,

4

but Mr. Weaver has successes now, and he had successes in

5

2002 and he has successes in getting his, working toward his

6

own rehabilitation.

7

AP&P

What he is simply asking for, Your Honor, is that

8

you give him the time that he needs in order to complete that

9

process, in order to become a person who can be trusted, who

10

can be, if not a model citizen, at least a very good man.

11

And he is, I think, a very good man at the heart of it.

12

think I see that, Your Honor, in the fact that AP&P notes

13

that he has a history of violence.

14

possible violent (inaudible) future.

15

I

They note that he's a

With this criminal history, Your Honor, the only

16

violent crime he had was his most recent conviction for the

17

Assault By a Prisoner, and those circumstances, I think,

18

speak to themselves.

19

He acknowledged what he did was wrong and that his behavior

20

and his actions led to that, to the commission of that crime.

21

But there were, at that time, a situation I think that, he

22

was in a situation that caused that to happen.

23
24

He admitted responsibility for that.

He is not inherently a violent man.

And I think,

really honestly that he is not inherently an evil man. He

25 J cares very much and he has the capacity to care for and,
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1

quite frankly, be cared by a great many people.

2

Dr. Deuso has, on his own initiative, invested a great deal

3

of time and effort in regard to his (inaudible) education.

4

And quite frankly, as have I.

5

impressed me how very hard he has worked.

6

you have been able to see that in the past 15 months that we

7

have been dealing with this case.

8

His sister,

He has worked hard and he has
And I hope that

Mr. Weaver has a great deal of intelligence.

He

9

has, I think, a great deal of natural empathy, but he will

10

always struggle to become the person that he should be and

11

the person I think that he is ultimately capable of being.

12

What we're simply asking, Your Honor, is that you give him

13

the opportunity to become that person, and you give him the

14

opportunity to complete the treatment program he has with Dr.

15

Deuso, to show this Court, AP&P and ultimately, if possible,

16

DCFS that he can be a good person, that he can be a person

17

who ultimately can be responsible for his children.

18

THE COURT: Let's hear from Mr. Weaver.

19

MS. VIERA: Your Honor, if we could have Dr. Deuso

20

also speak at this time?

21

THE COURT: Doctor?

22

DR. DEUSO: Good morning, Your Honor.

23

THE COURT: Good morning.

24

DR. DEUSO: I have known Mr. Weaver since just prior

25

Go ahead.

to the event that incarcerated him in 1995, well, it was
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1

1994, it was about four years ago where he had, he'd actually

2

been working with a local attorney who had appealed to me to

3

support him through a process and since that time I have

4

virtually spent hundreds and hundreds of hours trying to work

5

with Mike, get him organized and to keep him organized,

6

Through that period of time I have seen a lot of different

7

changes and a lot of different challenges that he's had to

8

meet.

9

the most resourceful person I may have ever met, and

He is an interesting and resourceful person.

Probably

10

impressed certainly in that arena.

11

impulsive, quite anxious as a person who - in my background I

12

was a State trooper in Massachusetts for ten years, my first

13

impression of Michael was he can't be very much of a criminal

14

because he had too much emotion and too much of a sense of

15

guilt when people push it and I thought that those were all

16

vulnerabilities in those populations, so he's been a learning

17

experience for me,

18

He tends to be very

He has done everything I've ever asked him to do

19

and more, and in terms of meeting any kind of counseling

20

expectations, appointments, assignments, trying new skills,

21

even in efforts that he's made to negotiate with other folks

22

throughout his life, he's often times tried to imply - employ

23

things that we've discussed.

24

It's pretty easy to work with someone who will try what you

And that's been impressive.

25 I ask them to do.
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1

In terms of the outpatient services that we've

2

continued to provide him with, I provided those services

3

because repeatedly he was instructed by different entities to

4

get his treatment, but because he had remained abstinent and

5

he was not eligible for admission in virtually all of those

6

programs.

7

address this issue, we provided him with intensive outpatient

8

services which he started about three months ago.

9

missed a session.

So, as a last effort in January, at his behest to

He's never

He would typically be looking at

10

graduating from the intensive outpatient portion, right about

11

this time, and he would be moving into what they consider

12

general outpatient setting for the next six months.

13

You know, one of the things that does strike me

14

when I look back at his history and I hear some of it

15

reported by his attorney in here is that we certainly

16

accomplished an awful lot in two or three years and I, you

17

know, outside of the piece that certainly is expected and

18

required in terms of accountability, we've done a lot more

19

than he could have ever done in any incarcerated

20

circumstance. So, I feel very good about that.

21

And on a personal level, Mr. Weaver, even though

22

he's been unable to pay me for services, I don't have any

23

more snow.

24

more bushes, I don't have any more weeds, and it's all

I don't have any more trees, I don't have any

25 J reflection of his gestures.

Again, spontaneously, two or
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1

three o'clock on a Sunday afternoon (inaudible) go by my

2

place and he's pulling weeds.

3

him to stay in treatment with me.

4

gesture and I'm impressed by the fact that he won't take it

5

for free, so.

That's not a requirement for

6

THE COURT: Thank you.

7

DR. DEUSO: Thank you.

8

THE COURT: Mr. Weaver.

9

THE COURT:

10

materials, it's okay.

I offer it as a genuine

While Mr. Weaver's organizing his
What's the State's position?

11

MR. THOMAS: (Inaudible).

12

THE COURT: Go ahead.

13

MR. THOMAS: The State would like to call

14

Let's give him the last word.

(inaudible) of the case, he'd like to be heard.

15

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Weaver, go right ahead.

16

DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I had to write this out.

I

17

wanted to say to the Honorable Judge Himonas. I'm very

18

thankful for the time you've let me stay out of jail. With

19

all these matters being set, I've been working diligently on

20

all aspects of my life.

21

and I'm sure you already know them.

22

(Speaking with attorney).

23

Okay.

24

I've got a list of accolades here

I've been working at least 20 hours per week

for (inaudible) doing landscapes.

It's, my schedule is so

25 I haphazard with meetings and that, that I have not been able
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1
2

to keep full-time employment.
I've been committed to an intensive drug and

3

alcohol treatment program at least nine hours a week, four

4

hours aftercare and three hours LDS substance abuse. At some

5

point I offered to help the prosecution clear some of this

6

stuff up and any stuff that was charged or happen and nobody

7

seemed to want to work with me.

8

been making plans to volunteer for (inaudible) behavior, to

9

attend parenting through Children's Service Society.

10

point I had been visiting regularly with my children

11

(inaudible) with visitation rights (inaudible).

12

my children have been bounced from one foster care to another

13

and it has caused a great deal of stress for not only me, but

14

for the children.

15

I wrote three letters.

I've

At some

Even worse,

The children need stability and a loving, but firm,

16

family relationship in order to prosper, and especially my

17

children need me, their father, because I can provide this

18

stability and security now that I have committed myself to my

19

own recovery.

20

doing now will led to my family (inaudible).

21

system is full of people who are (inaudible), who are victims

22

of their own bad (inaudible), drug and alcohol often play a

23

role in (inaudible).

24

It is my sole hope that all of my work I am
The penal

I know I can do far better than I've done. I have a

25 J great motivation and I certainly am - I'm not scared to do
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1

time, I've done plenty of time.

I could have done this time

2

two years ago and probably been out by now.

3

it's important that I be available to parent these kids, and

4

this is why I've worked so hard and done so many things to

5

show the Court and everybody concerned that this is what I

6

want.

7

done my little bit of time and, you know, it's not the first

8

time.

At some point

Two years ago I could have took the plea, went out,

It's not what I want, but I'm not scared to do time.

9

I want to say what distinguishes me from those

10

behind prison bars is my drive and commitment to change my

11

life to make (inaudible) and be the best father I can be.

12

Above all else I've learned my actions affect others and many

13

undeserving people suffered as a result of my criminal

14

activity.

15

my theft and may never choose to forgive me, I have expressed

16

sincere apology (inaudible) what I did was wrong.

17

affects of my actions have rippled throughout society.

18

children directly affected, Brett has, I have. I've learned

19

new ways to resolve conflict and I feel proud because I'm

20

working to be a trustworthy individual, especially a

21

trustworthy father.

22

is gone, and that is the (inaudible) that makes it not just

23

(inaudible).

24
25 I happened.

Although Brett Thompson was directly affected by

The
My

When people hurt other people that trust

I sincerely apologize to Brett Thompson for what
There's no excuse.

It was terrible thing.

In my
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1

life I have never done anything like that to anybody like

2

that.

3

like this, and I feel really bad about what happened to

4

Brett, and I can't undo it and I'm willing to do whatever I

5

can do to straightened it out with him, any work, anything he

6

wants, if he's not satisfied with the work I done in his yard

7

all he's got to do is let me know and I will, I'll make it

8

(inaudible).

9

Court to know if there's anything I can do to undo what

I've done other crimes, but never nothing (inaudible)

I don't expect him to forgive me and I want the

10

happened, to (inaudible) the prosecutors, credit card

11

company, anybody, and this will never happen again.

12

THE COURT: Okay.

13

DEFENDANT: And I appreciate the time you let

14

me out, you know, against your better judgment at times.

15

Thank you.

16

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Weaver.

17

Yes.

18

MR. THOMAS: Judge, if we could call Brett Thompson?

19

THE COURT: Mr. Thompson, if you'll come up here.

20

Mr. Weaver is you'll stand over to the side,

21

please, with Ms. Viera.

22

Mr. Thompson, go right ahead.

23

MR. THOMPSON: Your Honor, I appreciate the

24

opportunity to address the Court.

This matter has been no

25

small thing to my family and I over the last couple of years.
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1

Prior to that, my association with Mike was that of a friend.

2

I even looked at myself as sort of a mentor at the

3

(inaudible).

4

him, I felt the opportunity, a sincere opportunity to take

5

him under my wing in a way and to try and help him through

6

some difficult times that he was experiencing with his

7

children, in his life, to try and understand him and help him

8

get a little bit of a leg up.

9

different times during this time said, "This is crazy, why

Age differences are such, I being younger than

There were folks that

10

are spending all this time and effort and so forth on someone

11

who is a current criminal?"

12

many times as well.

13

And I asked myself that many,

I've heard many things, as I've heard Mike express

14

to the Court today, I've heard the same kind of things

15

expressed to me over different circumstances, many times in

16

the past, and he has the ability to come off very, very

17

sincere.

18

What I doubt is his ability to control himself and, yes, he's

19

53 years old and days and weeks that I - months, years that I

20

spent with him, not the whole time, but various times, I

21

always felt the ability that I would have the ability to make

22

some sort of a difference with him.

And the thing is is I don't doubt his sincerity.

23

Well, during that summer when I hired him to work

24

in my yard, we were doing some remodeling, I felt as though

25 J our friendship was at a good point, frankly, a strong point,
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1

a peak point.

And I gave him the opportunity to be alone in

2

my house for probably no more than about an hour while I went

3

out and did an errand and during that time he proceeded to go

4

into my house, through my house, into my upstairs, into my

5

bedroom and go through dressers and drawers until he found

6

some credit cards that I hadn't used in a long time and then

7

he took them.

8

from a calculated standpoint, and - to see if they'd be

9

missed and they weren't, we didn't use these cards, and then

And then he waited for some time, I believe,

10

he began to charge things on them.

Small at first, and then

11

larger and larger, and then finally he was caught.

12

He proceeded to tell me afterwards when he called

13

me from jail that it was my fault because I had made it too

14

easy for him, and I suppose in this instance that making it

15

easy for him was a demonstration of trust on my part to him.

16

And I don't come here as a vindictive individual, I come here

17

just simply to state a frustration and this has been an

18

extreme hardship on my family, not just financially.

19

told me that he did this with the credit cards because he

20

knew that we wouldn't be held liable for this, that it would

21

just be the credit card companies that would basically take

22

the fall for this.

23

we were in the process of starting a business and that had an

24

affect on our credit rating and we were unable to obtain some

25

loans that we needed.

I

Mike

Well, that's not been the case actually,

We were fine but, but things like
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1

this, appointments that I'm missing right now for my work, I

2

feel as though those are investments in this particular issue

3

with Mike and it continues to go on.

4

My wife has been very traumatized by the fact that

5

someone was in our house, uninvited, going through her

6

things, and my children as well, and needless to say, this

7

has been a very, very difficult time.

8

struggled with his kids.

9

recidivism and in his criminal activities.

I know that Mike has

I know that he's struggled with his
However, Your

10

Honor, I felt it very important to come and say this before

11

the Court.

I appreciate your time.

12

THE COURT: Thank you.

13

MR. THOMAS: We call Deputy Sanford, case number,

14

for case ending 7618, (inaudible).

15

THE COURT: Yes.

16

DEPUTY SANFORD: I just wanted to make the Court

17

aware that the situation involving Mr. Weaver and the

18

transport from the courthouse to the jail was probably the

19

most stressful and challenging physical altercation I had in

20

10 years of police work.

21

was to kick out the window and jump out of that vehicle while

22

we were in motion on the freeway, and that he would use any

23

means possible to effect that, including harming me.

24

my opinion he showed a reckless and selfish disregard for

25

public safety, and a reckless disregard to his own safety.

I

He convinced me that his intention

And in
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And my biggest concern, I had my weapon on, I had

1
2

previously made the judgment and evaluation on him that he

3

was not going to calm down and I made a special transport

4

arrangement for him to be transported by himself with two

5

deputies.

6

and he - his physical actions were extremely violent.

7

kicked and pushed himself with his feet on the ceiling over

8

the seat, landed on me and proceeded to wrestle me all over

9

the inside of that van for nearly 10 minutes, and he did not

And I attempted to restrain him from the beginning
He

10

voluntarily end the confrontation.

11

control of him without - I had some serious doubts at the

12

time whether I'd be able to achieve that.

13

I had to gain physical

I also need to let the Court know that I was

14

injured and I was - my muscles were sore for three days

15

afterwards, that's probably the most committed physical

16

altercation I've ever had in my life, and I've also spend 20

17

years studying Karate as well, so I'm no stranger to physical

18

exertion and aggressive fights, I guess is the best way to

19

put it.

20

So, the other thing I wanted to point out was that

21

my assessment in the be ginning was based on an observation of

22

ext:remely man ipulative, very selfish, escalating behavior.

23

He was causin g a disturbance in the court holding area and

24

that was why I made the decision that I made.

25

in interactions with a number of officers and the pattern

I observed him
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1

that he exhibited was that each time a new person came, he

2

would redirect his attention to that person, he would start a

3

whole series of statements over again from the beginning in

4

an attempt to gain his way, and I saw that and I said,

5

is not going in a good direction."

6

to get him out of there and get him to jail.

7

stop fighting until I put him in this position where I was

8

actually afraid that I was going to hurt him.

9

position where he was pinned up against the wall of the van

xx

this

And that's why I decided
And he did not

I had him in a

10

(inaudible) of the seat and all of my weight was on his head

11

and shoulder, and that was when he stopped fighting.

12

that's all I have to say.

So

13

THE COURT: Anything else?

14

MR. THOMAS: Yes, Judge, the State's position is

15

that this defendant be sentenced to prison, forthwith.

16

Second, we are in full agreement with these recommendations

17

for consecutive.

18

upon everything discussed in the report, primarily, these are

19

single criminal episodes involving multiple victims as well

20

as the exhaustive history.

21

Essentially, Judge, this case (inaudible)

Judge, if I could just address a few other things

22

defense counsel raised.

With respect to the recommendations

23

of AP&P, essentially case ending 2866 occurs while his child

24

was in the car, that was the violent felony, the violent

25 I felony of a dangerous weapon, so this assertion that it's
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1

criminal activity is the result of losing his children, at

2

least with respect to that case, doesn't seem plausible.

3

Finally, the aggravating circumstances addressed, I

4

think further warrant consecutive sentencing and that is his

5

attitude is not conducive to supervision.

6

the report, it wasn't just because of his long criminal

7

history, but his attitude and also the LSI puts him in a high

8

risk to victimize (inaudible) further.

9

with his significant history of victimizing the community,

They noted that in

That together, Judge,

10

he, this will be his fourth (inaudible) conviction.

11

over 45 arrests and close to 16 misdemeanor convictions.

12

He's got

As far as - further I believe, AP&P is concerned

13

about his ability to be supervised due to his history of

14

supervision.

15

times.

16

recently, Judge, he was, his felony probation, this, I think

17

three-four years ago was revoked in two different courtrooms.

18

The defense counsel does cite successful completion of

19

probation, however, case ending 7618 occurred while he was

20

out on pre-trial services.

21

Sanford occurred while he was already on felony - in

22

jurisdiction of felony court.

23

orders, with supervision is, quite frankly with all due

24

respect, has been dismal.

25

He was paroled and revoked, I believe, seven

He was an inmate on 11 different occasions and just

The assault against Deputy

So, his compliance with court

The other thing that is concerning, Mr. Weaver
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1

raises the issue that, you know, he's helped, he's tried to

2

help prosecution, you know, resolve these matters with

3

(inaudible) sincerity.

4

Sentence Report by Mr. Weaver's own statement that he

5

admitted to the, sorry, the victim, you know, this is the

6

victim in the other matter, the burglary, that he misled the

7

police and prosecution in order to buy time for his deal.

8

That seems quite the opposite of Mr. Weaver (inaudible)

9

today.

However, it's noted in the Pre-

In fact, the explanation he gives that it wasn't him,

10

again, not taking into, taking accountability for his

11

actions, it seems to be even more culpable that he would set

12

somebody up, throw them under the bus, so that he could use

13

his testimony to essentially get his children back, and

14

holding that - withholding that information so that he could

15

use that as leverage with the feds.

16

THE COURT: All right, wrap up.

17

MR. THOMAS: Okay. So, Judge, everything that's

18

considered, and the State is in full agreement with the

19

recommendation from AP&P and that is prison, consecutively

20

(inaudible).

21

THE COURT: Briefly, Ms. Viera.

22

MS. VIERA: Very briefly, Your Honor, I just want to

23

make two points.

The statements regarding (inaudible) heard

24

them as well, did occur, however, before Mr. Weaver entered

25 J into the plea agreement.

As I stated, he has been working
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1

very hard (inaudible) responsibility and he's made great

2

steps in that regard.
In regard to not being conducive to supervision, he

3
4

is proving now that he is conducive to supervision, has

5

proven that he has (inaudible) supervision.

6

he's been doing.

7

do, and I believe that he (inaudible).

He's doing exactly what he's been told to

THE COURT: Is there any legal reason of which you

8
9

That is what

are aware of why I should not proceed to sentence?

10

MS. VIERA: No, Your Honor.

11

THE COURT: All right.

With respect to Count, to

12

case ending 866, with a charge of the Possession or Purchase

13

of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a Third Degree

14

Felony, Mr. Weaver, I'm sentencing you to 0-5 at the Utah

15

State Prison.

16

With respect to case ending 570, Forgery, a Third

17

Degree Felony, I'm sentencing you to 0-5 at the Utah State

18

Prison.
With respect to the charge of Burglary, a Second

19
20

Degree Felony, I'm sentencing you to 1-15 at the Utah State

21

Prison.

22

another.

23

Those two counts will run concurrent with one

With respect to case ending 618, Assault By a

24

Prison, ca Third Degree Felony, I'm sentencing you to 0-5 at

25

the Utah State Prison. Cases 866, 570 and 618 will run
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consecutive to one another,
2 I

Mr. Weaver, I am, it is with a heavy heart, but

3

your, your extensive criminal history and the multiplicity of

4

actions just cries out for such serious sanction.

5

the time, Mr. Weaver.

6

Utah State Prison for 1-30 years.

This isn't

He is going to be committed to the

7

I also want to state on the record the basis for

8

the consecutive finding, the extensive criminal history as

9

well as the fact that we are dealing with multiple different

10

criminal episodes in this matter.

11

to appeal.

You have 30 days in which

Thank you,

12

DEFENDANT: Your Honor, (inaudible).

13

THE COURT: Talk to Ms. Viera here quickly, Mr,

14

Weaver, take care of it,

15

DEFENDANT: Thank you, Your Honor.

16 J

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25 |
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RULE 23B MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO REMAND
THE CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT
FOR SUPPLEMENTATION OF THE
RECORD ON APPEAL AND ENTRY
OF FINDINGS OF FACT
Case No. 20070136-CA

Pursuant to Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant
Michael Weaver moves this Court for an Order remanding the case to the trial court for
the entry of findings of fact due to the existence of "nonspeculative allegation of facts, not
fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could support a determination that
counsel was ineffective.1' Utah R. App. P. 23B(a).
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Michael Samuel Weaver is currently appealing his conviction of
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a third degree felony. See
Record on Appeal ("R") at 207. Mr. Weaver's appellate arguments will claim, inter alia,

1

that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated. U.S.
Const, amend VI; Utah Const, art. I, § 12.
In State v. Litherkwd, 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92, our high court noted the many
difficulties that face appellate counsel in his or her attempt to raise ineffective claims
against trial counsel In the past, cw[g]enerally[,] a claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel
cannot be raised on appeal because the trial record is insufficient to allow the claim to be
determined/' 2000 UT 76, «j| 12 (quoting State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah
1991)). Our supreme court also recognized, however, that the actions or inactions of trial
counsel may have contributed to an inadequate record.

wt

[W]ith respect to the defendant's

burden of providing an adequate record on appeal, counsel's ineffectiveness may have
caused, exacerbated, or contributed to the record deficiencies, thus presenting the
defendant with a catch-22 unique to claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel."
Litherland, 2000 UT 7 6 4 12.
In an effort to allow for a proper record for reviewing ineffective claims, rule 23B
was adopted in 1992. The rule now provides that "[a] party to an appeal in a criminal
case may move the court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact
... necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel." Utah R. App. P. 23B(a). uWith the adoption of this rule, a ready procedural
mechanism for addressing the inadequate record dilemma was grafted into the appeals
process." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 14.
Indeed, when faced with an inadequate record on appeal, this Court has found
2

itself unable to address many contested issues due to the lack of factual findings in the
record. See Prove City v. Thompson, 2002 UT App. 63, H 11, 44 P-3d 828 ("defendant
did not request a remand under Rule 23 B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to
substantiate the assertion he now argues would support his claim of ineffective assistance.
Without a proper record before us, we are unable to say whether counsel's alleged
deficiency in failing to investigate prejudiced defendant."); State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960
(Utah App. 1998) (finding record inadequate for treatment of ineffectiveness claims).
The Litherland opinion concluded, however, "where, on direct appeal, defendant
raises a claim that trial counsel was ineffective (and assuming defendant is represented by
different counsel than at trial), defendant bears the burden of assuring the record is
adequate/' 2000 UT 76, ^| 16. uIf a defendant is aware of any 'nonspeculative allegation
of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could support a
determination that counsel was ineffective,' Utah R. App. P. 23B, defendant bears the
primary obligation and burden of moving for a temporary remand." Litherland, 2000 UT
76,1|16.
In accordance with the above authority, Mr. Weaver thus moves this Court to stay
the briefing schedule and to remand this case to the trial court for supplementation of the
record on appeal with specific, non-speculative facts, which support his claimed
violations of his right to the effective assistance of counsel, U.S. Const, amend. VI; State
v. Hernandez, 2005 UT App 5461J 17, 128 P.3d 556 (Utah App. 2005) (citation omitted)
(ineffective assistance of counsel may be established by showing that counsel *\\)
3

rendered deficient performance which fell below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment, and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him").
ARGUMENT
"Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have not
been resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall be brought to
the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working
days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department." Utah Code
Ann. § 77-l8-l(6)(a). Mr. Weaver's pro se docketing statement, tiled April 4, 2007,
already outlined a number of inaccuracies and omissions in the presentence report which
were not corrected at sentencing:
Prior to sentencing January 12, 2007, Mr. Weaver (Appellee) received a copy of
the Presentence Report from LDA Viera, this was on January 10lh late afternoon.
When Mr. Weaver reviewed the report he became concerned as the content of the
report was not accurate and very biased. At one of the interviews with APP Mr.
Weaver was told by supervisor Ken Shelton that as long as Mr. Weaver continued
to perform as he was while on probation APP had no reason to recommend
incarceration. The report contained no mention of such an agreement. Nor did the
report contain a log of the various therapy, counseling, psychotherapy, church,
court appearances, completed programing, psychological testing, and status of
children's placement, nor any interview with employers or the attempt by Mr.
Weaver to recover lost property from the credit card, nor did the report contain the
fact that the credit card victim Brett Thompson was in "'collusion" with the foster
parents of my children. LDA Brenda Viera as well as the court prosecutors were
well aware of the improper relationship of Brett Thompson and Craig Kehl as both
appeared at several court hearings. This relationship borders on revenge instead of
justice by Mr. Thompson - my children's status, visiting has been used by the
Kehls (foster parents) as a tool for many months. This is also in court records
(Juvenile Court).
I appeared before Judge Himonas January 1 llh 2007, in an attempt to speak to him
about all of the above as well as my attorney's ineffective eoeicion of plea, failure
4

to correct Presentence and fact she never intended to follow through on her
promise to use "full LDA resources". She actually went on vacation right after my
plea. Judge Himonas told me he couldn't talk to me about anything, as there was
no persecutor there and it was ex parte. 1 hereby requested the court to review
facts and grant a new trial, appeal bond and new counsel. 1 have requested an
attorney through the Court to hand this appeal, so far nothing...
See State of Utah v. Michael Samuel Weaver, Docketing Statement, filed April 4, 2007 (a
copy is attached as Addendum A).1
An evidentiary hearing is needed to supplement the record with facts relevant to
whether prior defense counsel, having been informed by his client of errors in the presentence report, still neglected to bring such matters to the attention of the trial court.
If resolution of the objections affects the trial court's view of the appropriate
sentence, the trial court may then revise the sentence accordingly. This disposition
is appropriate in the present case because [Appellant] alleges that he was
prejudiced by the district court's failure to resolve the alleged inaccuracies in the
report. Allowing the district court to revisit the sentences after resolving the
alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report gives appropriate
deference to the district court's sentencing function. Accordingly, we remand, but
reject the State's request that we affirm the sentences prior to remand.
State v. Weaver, 2007 UT App 229 (per curiam) (a copy of the unpublished decision is
attached as Addendum B) (citing State v. Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, <\\ 31, 94 P.3d
295).

The same sort of prejudice exists in the case at bar. Coincidentally, the above
quoted language and appeal also involved the same defendant, with similar principles

1

Affidavits typically are used in support of a Rule 23 B motion. Utah R. App. P 23B(b). Hie above
statements were personally written by Mr. Weaver and attested to through his signature to the pro se pleading. His
docketing statement is the functional equivalent of the affidavit.

5

ringing true in both matters. For example, in the prior Weaver appeal, this Court noted,
"While the State's arguments that Weaver was not prejudiced by any alleged error and that
the issue is now moot are plausible, the record is not sufficiently clear to allow us to make
those determinations.... Further, while Weaver speaks mainly to the jail term associated
with his probation, it is possible that resolution of the inaccuracies in his presentence
investigation report could have led to different, and more favorable, probationary terms."
Weaver, 2007 UT App 229 n. 1.
Resolution of the inaccuracies in the presentence report may have had a bearing

f
\

ff

here as well. [I]t is of no moment that the trial court may disregard the presentence
report altogether in imposing a sentence. A defendant still has a right to disclosure of the
report because of the subsequent uses made of it." State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1009
(Utah 1982) (citing State v. Lockwood, 399 So.2d 190 (La. 1981)); State v. Lipsky, 608
P.2d 1241 (Utah, 1980) ("A defendant's right to be sentenced on the basis of information
that is accurate can be protected only if the pre-sentence report is disclosed to him prior to
sentencing;'); State v. Lipsky, 639 P.2d 174 (Utah, 1981) ("We mandated that the report
should be disclosed to the defendant and if he thinks the report is inaccurate in any
particular, he should then be given the opportunity to bring such inaccuracies to the
court's attention/').
One difference between the two Weaver appeals should be noted. In the previous
remanded appeal, see 2007 UT App 229, ineffective assistance of counsel ("IAC")

6

arguments were raised but not decided in the opinion. In the current appeal, IAC
arguments are the only means through which this Court may address his sentencing issue.
Plain error is inapposite because Weaver's trial counsel failed to raise the sentencing
inaccuracies with the trial judge. A lower court cannot err on matters of which it had no
knowledge.
u

[W]ith respect to the defendant's burden of providing an adequate record on

appeal, counsel's ineffectiveness may have caused, exacerbated, or contributed to the
record deficiencies, thus presenting the defendant with a catch-22 unique to claims of
ineffectiveness of trial counsel." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, "j| 12. Indeed here, in violation
of the statute against waiver, Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (6)(b), prior defense counsel did
in fact cause, exacerbate, or contribute to the record deficiencies by failing to challenge
the accuracy of the presentence investigation report. See id. ("If a party fails to challenge
the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter
shall be considered to be waived.").2
Rule 23B allows the record to be supplemented with facts relating to prior defense
counsel's ineffectiveness. Both prongs of the IAC standard are met. Prior counsel's
failure to disclose the inaccuracies in the presentence report constituted "deficient
performance which fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment"

While this Court has required the attorney, who acts on behalf of the defendant, to preserve the record for
his client, the opposite is not true A defendant need not personally and independently object to the introduction of
evidence at trial nor to the inaccuracies in a PSR in an effort to supplant the role of his inactive attorney. Otherwise,
there would be no such theory as ineffective assistance of counsel because the defendant himself, separate and apart
irom the attorney's (m)actions, would be held responsible foi any and ail attorney wrongdoing

7

and "counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him." State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005,
1009 (Utah 1982) ("[I]t is of no moment that the trial court may disregard the presentence
report altogether in imposing a sentence"); Weaver, 2007 UT App 229 n.l ("it is possible
that resolution of the inaccuracies in his presentence investigation report could have led to
different, and more favorable, probationary terms.")
DATED this \&_ day of August, 2007

RONALD FUJINO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
1, VANESSA COLEMAN, hereby certify that on this|£#~day of August, 2007,1
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Utah Attorney General's Office
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O.Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854

umm fA'JM.
VANESSA COLEMAN
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Addendum A
(State of Utah v. Michael Samuel Weaver,
Docketing Statement, filed April 4, 2007)

SAMPLE FORM
DOCKETING STATEMENT OUTLIJS& _ r
[Counsel's name & bar number
Counsel's address
Counsel\s telephone number j
Counsel for Appellant .
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; IN THE A A M E u F C u U R T '
[PLAINTIFF.!,
Rlaintiff/Appeflant,

!.M.)CKl:TiNC.i STATEMENT
C W . \ u . Appellate cosr number] Z<*> 7£>« S " * ClA
Ueanc; Ci. No [Di.sm O . number| c>6 / c}<0£>{&&>

vs.
[DEFENDANT I,
Defendant/Appellee.

C ia:.:> m m i o e ; •

PURSUANT TO RULE 9, Utah Rules of Appellate iho^caure, appellant submits in is docketing
statement.
1. Nature oi" the proceeding. Uns appeal i.> w jm-a fma! jucgiTientT^raerJ [decree] of the [identify
lower court or agency].
^_-—-""^"^
2. Jurisdiction. This Court ha* jurisdiction puisuaiu to [Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)( )] [Utah Code Ann.
§78-2a-3(2)( )].
3. Relevant dates.
a. Date the final judgment or order appealed from was entered: J ^ "v ^ " X «-'- "?
b. Date the notice of appeal or petition for review was hied; - —
c U ) Date any motions filed pursuant to Rules 50(b), 52(b), or 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
k u e 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, or ! Itah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 were filed: —
(2.) Date and effect of any orders disposing of such motions;
4. Inmate mailbox rule. The appeliai(f[isjftsnotj an inmate confined in an insLiturion invoking rule
5. Rule 54(b). This appeal {'is jQj^jfTG^Jj^11*1 a , ! J K ^ ; ;Ii a multiple part) or a multiple claim case in
which the judgment has been certified as a final mogmeiu h\ the trial com! pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah
Ruie^of Civil Procedure. |l.f fins is such a case, add the following mformation;]
(^jT^"'3Tie following claims and parties remain before, live !r;ai coun I'oi adjudication:
b. The facts underlying this appeal iarej |aie notj sufficieiuly similar to the facts underlying the
claims remaining before the trial court to eonstmiie res judicata on tiiose chums..
6. Criminal cases. (If this is a criminal ease, Male j
__--._
a. The defendant was jciiarged wjihj |fi me appea; arises iroiu a dismissaKQj^^
the
appeal arises from a conviction) the ioiiuving cnmeiS;. ''list:
•>-.
^ . ;)
0 The delendam received tin: following sosiLence. . s» >c:c i (\ venience|. /" f$'
\>^i^iC/ y
:
hue lielendari! c u r r e n t l ^ T ^ ^ s noli iii.-;iK-.c.m:ii-d.
<^;~m-..r^
V^'^V^^V
•i.-mpcal A p n e M a i r . W f f c i M o a ^

;.:-,uei.Si on apnea-

. ^

*V*x^

^f^r^i

.Succinctly stale riic firs! issue ;
^ P ^ c* eV>,^
ima::vc |;.iw Ufilc any s;.;mm-:>. -me.-., o- c»:se.- ucie: mmanve ,.)! ihe Orsi issue
VHv:^ W ^ m > , _ p ,
C , ^y.
/
-X
-v d
-p^c"
tf^V^Wv.
\ s
• '~
• f

fe.

Standard of review: [State applicable standard of appellate review for the first issue, with
supporting authority.)
b, [Repeat for any additional issues.]
: Determinative law: |Cite any statutes, rules, or cases doi.ormiuaiivc ui the second issue.]
Standard of review: [State applicable standard of appellate review for the second issue, with
^supporting authority.]
S.yFactual summary. [Succinctly summarize the face, ueccssai v lo understand the issue(s) presented.]
9. Assignment. This appeal [is.|([is rjoj^suhjeci to transfer by ihe Supreme Couri to the Court of.
Appealsjnirsuan( to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4;. j If appropriate, add: j The appellant (advocates]
[J^pposesljuch a transferor) the following grounds;
"I'd. List one or more grounds].
JO. Related appeala^There are no related appeals.]]Tho following are related or prior appeals;
a. Give name, case mJFi^i
J J. Attachments. The following are attached:
__. T
j ,

M"x

a. The final .judgment or order from which the appeal is taken. -$— ^'^C^ ^ f ^ ^ 0 ^ *
l:>. Any rulings and/or findings of the trial cnurl or administrative tribunal included in the judgment rV '• .,»
or order from which the appeal is taken.
e. Any application for rehearing filed pursiiain to I itah Code Ann. § 54-7-15 (if the appeal arises
from an order of the Public Service CommissioiiJ or nodce of claim filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
63-30-J2 (if it arises from claims against the Stale or its employee aciing within the scope of employment
or under color of authority).
d. The notice of appeal and any order extending r.he nine for the filing of a notice of appeal.
e. Any motions filed pursuant to Rules 50(h), .52(b), 54(b), or 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, or Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6, and any orders disposing of
such motions.

f. ]f the appellant is an inmate confined in an msutuuon invoking rule 4(f), the notarized statement
or written declaration required by rule 4(f), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
DATED;

*

|Signature of attorney or pro se party) pj^c
•Name of attorney or pro se party]
, n
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CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE
I certify that a true and correei copy of the foregoing Docketing Sun.cmenl was mailed by first class mail
this jdate] to the following:
[Opposing counsel's name and address]
[If the appeal arises from a crime charged as a iclony or a juvenile court delinquency proceeding, include
following:]
Utah Attorney General
Appeals Division
160 East 300 South
PC) BOX 140854
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Addendum B
State v. Weaver, 2007 UT App 229 (per curiam)

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

State of Utah,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Michael S. Weaver,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 20060482-CA
F I L E D
(June 28, 2007)
2 0 07 UT App 22 9

Second District, Farmington Department, 051700456
The Honorable Rodney S. Page
Attorneys:

Scott L. Wiggins, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Karen A. Klucznik, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Orme, and Thorne.
PER CURIAM:
Michael S. Weaver appeals his sentence for theft, a third
degree felony. Weaver argues that the district court erred by
failing to resolve alleged inaccuracies in the presentence
investigation report. He also argues that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to ensure that the district court
resolved the alleged inaccuracies in the presentence
investigation report.
Weaver argues that the district court erred in failing to
resolve alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation
report. The State concedes that the district court failed to
comply with Utah Code section 77-18-1(6)(a) by not resolving the
alleged inaccuracies on the record.
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-181(6) (a) (Supp. 2006). However, the State argues that Weaver was
not prejudiced by this mistake during sentencing, or
alternatively, that the issue is moot because Weaver has already
served his jail term. Accordingly, it requests this court to
affirm Weaver's sentence and remand solely to comply with section
77-18-1 (6) (a) .
In State v. Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, 94 P.3d 295, we held
chat the district court erred m failing to resolve Maroney's

objections to the sentencing reports, and we remanded to allow
the court to resolve the objections on the record. See id. at
1(31. We went on to state that " [i] f resolution of the objections
affects the trial court's view of the appropriate sentence, the
trial court may then revise the sentence accordingly."
Id. This
disposition is appropriate in the present case because Weaver
alleges that he was prejudiced by the district court's failure to
resolve the alleged inaccuracies in the report. Allowing the
district court to revisit the sentences after resolving the
alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report
gives appropriate deference to the district court's sentencing
function. Accordingly, we remand, but reject the State's request
that we affirm the sentences prior to remand.l
Based upon our review of the record and the State's
concession, we remand the case so "the sentencing judge can
consider the objections to the presentence report, make findings
on the record as to whether the information objected to is
accurate, and determine on the record whether that information is
relevant to sentencing." State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT l,f44, 973
P. 2d 404. After resolving the alleged inaccuracies in the
presentence investigation report, the district court may revise
the sentence as it deems appropriate. Our disposition makes it
unnecessary to consider Weaver's alternative argument alleging
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
This matter is remanded to the district court.

Russell W. Bench,
Presiding Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

1

While the State's arguments that Weaver was not prejudiced
by any alleged error and that the issue is now moot are
plausible, the record is not sufficiently clear to allow us to
make those determinations. More particularly, we do not know the
exact nature of the alleged inaccuracies with the presentence
investigation report. Further, while Weaver speaks mainly to the
jail term associated with his probation, it is possible that
resolution of the inaccuracies in his presentence investigation
report could have led to different, and more favorable,
probationary terms.

20:60482-CA

2

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

20060482-CA
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

MICHAEL SAMUEL WEAVER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

STATE'S RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT5S
RULE 23B MOTION TO REMAND
Case No. 20070136-CA

Defendant seeks a remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to
explore his claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise and correct
at sentencing "a number of inaccuracies and omissions in the presentence [investigation]
report[.]" Rule 23B Memorandum in Support of Motion to Remand the Case to the Trial
Court for Supplementation of the Record on Appeal and Entry of Findings of Fact ["Memo"]
at 4-5.
The State opposes a remand because defendant has neither alleged specific, nonrecord facts, which if true, would establish that counsel rendered deficient performance nor

provided the requisite sworn support therefor. The State's position is set out more fully
below.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS
On November 28, 2006, as part of a plea agreement globally disposing of four
outstanding cases against him, defendant entered a guilty plea in this case to possession of
a dangerous weapon by a restricted felon, a third degree felony, and the court ordered
preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report (R 152-53, 158). The charge to which
defendant pled guilty involved the discovery of "a sharp kitchen knife" during a search of
defendant's car and defendant's prior conviction of a violent felony (R 39-40, 154-61).
Sentencing occurred on January 12, 2007 (R 164). The court sentenced defendant to
an indeterminate term of zero-to-five years in the state prison (R 164). Defendant filed a
timely notice of appeal (R 169-70). New counsel was appointed for defendant and has filed
a motion pursuant to rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to remand the case to the
trial court for a hearing and entry of findings of fact on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel at sentencing (R 200-04). Defendant seeks to "supplement the record with facts
relevant to whether prior defense counsel, having been informed by his client of errors in the
pre-sentence report, still neglected to bring such matters to the attention of the trial court."
Memo at 5.

2

ARGUMENT
THIS COURT SHOULD DENY THE RULE 23B MOTION BECAUSE
DEFENDANT HAS PROVIDED NEITHER NONSPECULATIVE
ALLEGATIONS OF NONRECORD FACTS NOR SWORN SUPPORT
FOR HIS CLAIMS, AS IS REQUIRED BY THE RULE
Defendant claims that his trial counsel's performance was deficient because she failed
to correct at sentencing "a number of inaccuracies and omissions in the presentence report[.]"
Memo at 4-5. He provides a list of infonnation omitted from his presentence investigation
[PSI] report and, quoting from one of his previous appeals, argues summarily that
"[resolution of the inaccuracies in the presentence report may have had a bearing" in this
case. Id. at 6. His sole support for his motion is his pro se docketing statement, which he
views to be "the functional equivalent of the affidavit" required by rule 23B. Id. at 5, n.l.
This Court should deny defendant's motion because defendant entirely fails to meet
his burden under the rule to adduce, through affidavits, "nonspeculative allegation^] of facts,
not fully appearing in the record on appeal" that could support his claim of ineffectiveness
at sentencing. See Utah R. App. P. 23B(a) & (b).
A.

Requirements for obtaining a remand under rule 23B
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show both: (1) that trial

counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) that "there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687-88,690,694 (1984); State v. Holbert, 2002 UT

3

App 426, f 58, 61 P.3d 291 (holding there was no deficient performance where counsel's
action may be the result of a tactical choice); see also State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 19,
12 P.3d 92 (addressing the prejudice prong); State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998)
(same). The showing of prejudice must be a "demonstrable reality and not a speculative
matter." Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50 (quotation omitted).
This Court has explained that there are "four basic requirements for obtaining a 23B
remand" which go beyond merely alleging that counsel was ineffective:
•

First, the motion must be supported by affidavits that set forth "'facts not fully
appearing in the record on appeal that show the claimed deficient performance
of the attorney.'" State v. Johnston, 2000 UT App 290, \ 8, 13 P.3d 175
(quoting Utah R. App. P. 23B(b)).

•

Second, "the facts alleged in support of a [r]ule 23B motion may not be
speculative." Id. at ^j 10. They must be specific and "done by affidavit." Id.
(quotations and citations omitted).

•

Third, the allegations must show that counsel's performance was objectively
deficient or, in other words, "the nonspeculative facts must focus on why
counsel's performance was deficient." Id.

•

Finally, the supporting affidavits must "'allege facts that show the claimed
prejudice suffered by the appellant as a result of the claimed deficient
performance."' Id. at ^ 13 (quoting Utah R. App. P. 23B(b)). Or, the alleged
facts, if true, must show "that the result would have been different had
counsel's performance not been deficient." Id.

4

B.

Defendant has not alleged sufficient facts to show what was omitted from
the PSI report let alone facts which establish that counsel was
constitutionally ineffective for not raising the "omissions" below
Defendant bases his ineffectiveness claim on a list of "inaccuracies and omissions"

which he initially submitted in his pro se docketing statement. See Memo at 4-5. Quoting
from that document, defendant claims that his former counsel should have informed the
sentencing court that the PSI made no reference to
-a statement allegedly made by defendant's probation supervisor Ken Shelton
that so long as defendant continued to perform as he was while on probation[,]
AP[&]P had no reason to recommend incarceration";
-a "log of the various therapy, counseling, psychotherapy, church, court
appearances, completed program[m]ing, psychological testing, and status of
children's placement";
-an "interview with employers";
-defendant's attempt "to recover lost property from the credit card"1; and
-collusion between the credit card victim and the foster parents of defendant's
kids.
Memo at 4. Defendant's list, however, falls far short of rule 23B's requirement that he allege
specific facts that establish counsel's deficient performance, and he offers nothing apart from
this list to support his claim. See Utah R. App. P. 23B.

!

One of the original charges against defendant involved his theft and use of credit
cards from Brett Thompson. See PSI Report at 2, 5.
5

1. Omission of supervisor's statement. Defendant faults his counsel for failing to
inform the sentencing court of a statement made by defendant's probation supervisor Ken
Shelton that Adult Probation and Parole [AP&P] would have "no reason to recommend
incarceration" so long as defendant continued to perform well on probation. Memo at 4.
However, he provides no authority suggesting such a statement must be included in a PSI
report, no affidavit from Mr. Shelton or anyone else who would testify on remand that the
statement was made, and no allegation of facts concerning the context in which the statement
was made or its relationship to the sentencing proceedings in this case. In addition,
defendant provides no support for his claim that his prior counsel had any knowledge of this
or any of the information allegedly omitted from the PSI report. He simply asserts in his
memorandum that his counsel "ha[d] been informed by h[er] client of errors in the
presentence report[.]5' Id at 5.
In fact, the record reflects that defense counsel understood AP&P's position on
sentencing differently. Defense counsel informed the sentencing court that defendant's
probation agent was Troy Staker and that Mr. Staker told counsel before the guilty plea was
entered that "he was more geared toward rehabilitation" and could not "overlook"
defendant's extensive thirty-five-year criminal history (R 207:37-38). See PSI Report at 4,
8-13. Defendant's unsupported allegation is at odds with the record and, without more, is
wholly inadequate to establish any deficient performance relating to this claim.

6

2. Absence of a "log of the various therapy, counseling, psychotherapy, church,
court appearances, completed program[m]ing, psychological testing, and status of
children's placement". Defendant alleges that his former counsel rendered deficient
performance when she failed to inform the sentencing court that the PSI report did not
include a comprehensive compilation of defendant's various mandatory and voluntary efforts
to atone for his actions and obtain help for his long-term problems. See Memo at 4.
However, he provides absolutely no facts elaborating on the specific information he claims
should have been included in such a "log," and he fails to cite authority requiring that such
information be included in the PSI report. Without the additional information, supported by
a sworn statement, defendant's general list falls short of his burden to adduce
"nonspeculative allegations] of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal" which
show counsel's allegedly deficient performance. See Utah R. App. P. 23B(a) & (b);
Johnston, 2000 UT App 290, \ 8.
Moreover, the sentencing court had before it much of the type of information to
which defendant alludes. Defendant himself explained to the court that his schedule was
filled with meetings, that he was "committed to an intensive drug and alcohol treatment
program at least nine hours a week[,]"and that he had "been making plans to volunteer for
(inaudible) behavior, [and] to attend parenting [classes]" (R 207:47).
Defendant's therapist, Dr. Deuso, spoke at length about his association with defendant
since 1995 (R 207:43-46). He explained that they've spent "virtually . . . hundreds and
7

hundreds of hours" working together, and that defendant did "everything" Dr. Deuso
required of him in terms of meeting "counseling expectations, appointments, assignments,
[and] trying new skills" (R 207:44). Dr. Deuso provided outpatient services when defendant
was not eligible for admission into the normal programs, started "intensive outpatient
services" three months before sentencing, and noted that defendant had "never missed a
session" (R 207:45). He also highlighted his belief that defendant had "accomplished an
awful lot in two or three years . . . a lot more than he could have ever done in any
incarcerated circumstance." (id).
The PSI report contains defendant's statement that he was going to court "as
scheduled" at the time he stole Mr. Thompson's credit cards, references defendant's
completion of only seven substance abuse classes in March 2002, and reflects that at the time
the report was prepared, defendant was "attending mental health treatment through A&D
clinical psychotherapy." PSI Report at 7, 16, 19.
Defense counsel told the court that defendant had been "doing exactly what he's been
told to do" and that he had worked "very hard" at his own rehabilitation (R 207:43, 57). She
noted that since 2002, defendant had successfully completed a two-year probation, was
"compliant" with the district and juvenile courts, and that he "has always come to Court, he
has always done what was required of him[,] and he has always done what he said he would
do" (R 207:39-40). She explained that, "on his own initiative," he had been attending

8

treatment with Dr. Deuso and was providing services to the therapist in exchange for the
treatment (R 207:39).
Counsel also covered on the record the status of defendant's children, informing the
court that defendant's parental rights were terminated in August of 2006 and that defendant
was focused on appealing that decision (id). Defendant explained that he visited his children
"regularly" when he had visitation rights and that they "have been bounced from one foster
care to another[,]" causing "a great deal of stress" for all involved (R 207:47).
The present record clearly contains an abundance of information concerning the
general areas on defendant's list, including defendant's efforts at rehabilitation and
responsibility, and defendant has not alleged that any crucial information was omitted.
3. Omission of "any interview with employers". Defendant claims his former
counsel was deficient for failing to inform the court below of the absence from the PSI report
of "any interview with employers". Memo at 4. Contrary to rule 23B(b)5 he offers no
elaboration or sworn support for this claim and, hence, fails to show that the information was
necessary to the PSI report or that there was anything deficient in counsel's failure to raise
it below.
4. Omission of defendant's attempt to recover lost property. While defendant
faults his counsel for failing to point out that the PSI report made no mention of his attempt
"to recover lost property from the credit card," he defeats his own motion by again providing

9

no additional information or sworn support concerning the claim, as required by rule 23B.
Memo at 4.
Moreover, defendant told the sentencing court that "[a]t some point [he] offered to
help the prosecution clear some of this stuff up and any stuff that was charged or happen[ed]
and nobody seemed to want to work with [him]" (R 207:47). He did not claim to have made
any additional effort to recover lost property, suggesting that the "attempt" to do so that is
referenced in his motion amounted only to the rejected offer to the prosecution, of which the
sentencing judge had knowledge.
5. No mention of collusion between victim and foster parents. Finally, defendant
notes the absence from the PSI report of any mention of the "collusion" between the credit
card victim, Brett Thompson, and the foster father of defendant's children. See Memo at 4.
He claims that his counsel necessarily knew of the "improper relationship" through the
appearance of both men "at several court hearings" and that counsel rendered deficient
performance by failing to bring the relationship to the attention of the sentencing court Id.
at 4-5. His claim, however, is wholly speculative and entirely insufficient to meet his burden
under rule 23B. The mere appearance of both men at any number of hearings does not
establish collusion. The foster family's alleged use of visitation "as a tool" is equally
insufficient to establish collusion where defendant makes no attempt to tie the conduct to Mr.
Thompson or to his own sentencing. Defendant offers no other factual allegations to bridge

10

the gap, and he provides no authority for requiring that the report include this information
or that counsel raise it at sentencing.

Defendant's motion and docketing statement are wholly inadequate to meet rule 23B 's
requirements as to even the first prong of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Despite his heavy burden under the rule, he offers only a general list of alleged omissions
devoid of facts or authority. He fails to establish that any crucial information was missing
from his PSI report, without which his counsel cannot have been deficient for failing to
articulate the omission to the sentencing court. Neither does defendant acknowledge that
some, if not all, of the information was otherwise presented to the sentencing court.
Defendant provides no basis upon which a remand may be granted, and this Court should,
accordingly, deny his motion. See State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 581 (Utah App. 1993) (a
remand is not appropriate to permit a defendant to conduct a fishing expedition).
PROPOSED ORDER
Defendant has submitted an insufficient proposed order. He proposes that this Court
order a remand that instructs the trial court "to hold a hearing and to make factual findings
in a manner consistent with Appellant's motion." Order Remanding the Case to the Trial
Court for Supplementation of the Record on Appeal and the Entry of Findings of Fact. His
order identifies none of the requisite factual issues or ineffectiveness claims with which to
direct the trial court's proceedings in this matter. Because of this failure, and the inadequacy
11

of defendant's rule 23B motion, the State does not propose any remand order in this matter.
See Utah R. App. P. 23B(b).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court should deny defendant's request for a rale 23B
remand.
DATED this , > / d a y of October, 2007.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
ATTORNEY GENERAL

KRIS 6. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For
Official Publication)
PER CURIAM:
*1 Michael S. Weaver appeals his sentence for theft, a third degree felony.
Weaver argues that the district court erred
by failing to resolve alleged inaccuracies in
the presentence investigation report. ^ He
also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that the district
court resolved the alleged inaccuracies in
the presentence investigation report.
Weaver argues that the district court
erred in failing to resolve alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation
report. The State concedes that the district
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court failed to comply with Utah Code section 77-18-l(6)(a) by not resolving the alleged inaccuracies on the record. SeeUtah
Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (Supp.2006).
However, the State argues that Weaver was
not prejudiced by this mistake during sentencing, or alternatively, that the issue is
moot because Weaver has already served
his jail term. Accordingly, it requests this
court to affirm Weaver's sentence and remand solely to comply with section
77-18-l(6)(a).
In State v. Maroney, 2004 UT App 206,
94 P.3d 295, we held that the district court
erred in failing to resolve Maroney's objections to the sentencing reports, and we remanded to allow the court to resolve the
objections on the record. See id. at f 31.We
went on to state that "[i]f resolution of the
objections affects the trial court's view of
the appropriate sentence, the trial court
may
then
revise
the
sentence
accordingly.'Yd. This disposition is appropriate in the present case because Weaver
alleges that he was prejudiced by the district court's failure to resolve the alleged
inaccuracies in the report. Allowing the
district court to revisit the sentences after
resolving the alleged inaccuracies in the
presentence investigation report gives appropriate deference to the district court's
sentencing function. Accordingly, we remand, but reject the State's request that
we
affirm the sentences prior to remand.™1
FN1. While the State's arguments
that Weaver was not prejudiced by
any alleged error and that the issue
is now moot are plausible, the record is not sufficiently clear to allow us to make those determinations. More particularly, we do not
know the exact nature of the alleged
inaccuracies with the presentence

© 2008 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Not Reported in P.3d
Not Reported in P.3d, 2007 WL 1848715 (Utah App.), 2007 UT App 229
(Cite as: Not Reported in P.3d)
investigation report. Further, while
Weaver speaks mainly to the jail
term associated with his probation,
it is possible that resolution of the
inaccuracies in his presentence investigation report could have led to
different, and more favorable, probationary terms.
Based upon our review of the record
and the State's concession, we remand the
case so "the sentencing judge can consider
the objections to the presentence report,
make findings on the record as to whether
the information objected to is accurate, and
determine on the record whether that information is relevant to sentencing."State
v. Jaeger, 1999 UT \9\ 44, 973 P.2d 404.
After resolving the alleged inaccuracies in
the presentence investigation report, the
district court may revise the sentence as it
deems appropriate. Our disposition makes
it unnecessary to consider Weaver's alternative argument alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
This matter is remanded to the district
court.
RUSSELL W. BENCH, Presiding Judge,
and GREGORY K. ORME and WILLIAM
A. THORNE JR., Judges, Concur.
Utah App.,2007.
State v. Weaver
Not Reported in P.3d, 2007 WL 1848715
(Utah App.), 2007 UT App 229
END OF DOCUMENT
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

CaseNo.20060482-CA

V.

,

MICHAEL S. WEAVER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from his sentence for theft, a third degree felony. This Court
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
L

Should this case be remanded for the trial court to resolve on the
record defendant's objections to his presentence investigation report?
"Whether the trial court properly complied with a legal duty to resolve on the

record the accuracy of contested information in sentencing reports is a question of law
that [this Court] review[s] for correctness." State v. Johnson, 2006 UT App 3, ^f 6, 129
P.3d 282 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert, denied, 138 P.3d 589
(Utah 2006).

II.

Has defendant established ineffective assistance of counsel at
sentencing where he has not shown that counsel's performance
negatively affected his sentence?
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal

presents a question of law reviewed for correctness. See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ^f 6,
89P.3dl62.
STATUTES AND RULES
The following relevant statutes and court rules are attached at Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (West 2004);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (West Supp. 2006).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
AND
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
According to defendant's plea affidavit, the following facts describe his crime:
Between December 16 and 21, 2004, defendant's automobile
was repaired at the Big O Tire Store in Bountiful, Utah. The car was
taken from the parking lot without the services or parts being paid
for. The defendant was found in possession of the vehicle on
December 29, 2004. The vehicle had tires that had been installed at
the Big O Tire Store. The defendant has previously been convicted
of theft in Salt Lake Third District Court. . ., theft by receiving in
Salt Lake Third District Court,. . . and Attempted Burglary with
intent to commit theft in Salt Lake Third District Court. . . and in
Layton City Second District C o u r t . . . .
(R. 52, 131-32).
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On March 185 2005, defendant was charged with theft, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (West 2004) (R. 1). Defendant waived his
preliminary hearing and was bound over as charged (R. 24, 26-27, 28).
On November 29, 2005, defendant pleaded guilty to theft (R. 48-49, 51-56). In
exchange for defendant's plea, the State agreed to recommend that defendant's prison
sentence be suspended and that he be placed on probation (R. 54). As terms of that
probation, the State would recommend that defendant pay restitution, serve a jail sentence
"concurrent with any jail sentence imposed as a result of any conviction of cases he has
pending in Third District Court," and "be given credit toward any jail sentence for any
time he has served . . . as a result of the revocation of his pre-trial release on October 21,
2005" (R. 54). The State further agreed "[t]hat upon payment of restitution the [S]tate
will stipulate to the defendant's motion to reduce the judgment to a Class A Misdemeanor
pursuant to U.C.A. § 76-3-402" (R. 54).
Before sentencing, defendant filed a letter requesting to withdraw his plea (R. 66,
97-98). Defendant was appointed new counsel, and a hearing on defendant's motion was
set (R. 66). At that hearing, defendant and his prior counsel testified (R. 71-72). The trial
court denied defendant's motion (R. 71-72).
After denying defendant's motion, the trial court asked defense counsel wnexher he
had received defendant's presentence investigation report (PSI) (R. 145:61). In response,
defense counsel indicated that the 1977 murder conviction listed in the report was
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"somebody else" whose name was John Wesley Weaver, not Michael S. Weaver. (R.
145:61). Defense counsel stated that defendant was "trying to get not only this but
several other matter[s] cleared up because they have this record overlaid with [that other
person]" (R. 145:61).
The trial court gave defendant ten days to file his objections to the presentence
investigation report, and gave the State ten days to respond to defendant's objections (R.
145:62). Nothing in the record indicates that defendant ever filed his objections with the
court.
At the next hearing, defense counsel provided the trial court with "some psycho
therapy clinics that [defendant] has been attending" and "some at-a-boys for classes he
has completed of therapy" (R. 145:64). After noting that defendant's PSI was now
several months old, the trial court ordered that sentencing be continued so that the report
could be updated (R. 145:64-65).
On May 9, 2006, the trial court held a final sentencing hearing. The PSI used at
sentencing was the same one that had been prepared several months earlier (R. 130). In
it, defendant acknowledged a juvenile record that included property violations and a
weapons charge (R. 133). The PSI also contained a record of defendant's adult criminal
history, which included convictions for theft in 1974; theft in 1977; burglary and
possession of an illegal firearm in 1977; possession of a firearm by a restricted person in
1980; burglary in 1981; three counts of theft in 1983; three counts of burglary in 1985;
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burglary in 2000, theft and possession of an illegal weapon in 2001; burglary in 2001; and
burglary in 2002 (R. 133-35). In addition, the PSI indicated that defendant was awaiting
sentence in Salt Lake County for possession of a controlled substance, unlawful
possession of a credit card, and possession of another's identification card; and that
defendant had warrants out on two counts of theft and one count of child endangerment
(R. 135). Finally, the PSI included in defendant's criminal history a 1977 conviction for
murder (R. 134). A parenthetical next to the listing indicated that defendant had told the
PSI preparer that the conviction was not his (Id).
At the hearing, the trial court asked defense counsel whether he had reviewed the
PSI with defendant (R. 145:67). Defense counsel responded: "It's still the one left from
January and I did have a copy of the letter dated April 13 from Troy Grogan from AP&P"
(R. 145:67). Without making Troy Grogan's letter a part of the record, counsel stated that
defendant "would like to address the Court, Your Honor" (R. 145:67).
Defendant told the court "that my pre-sentence report is still totally inaccurate.
There's a lot of errors and discrepancies in there. All Mr. Grogan really did is write a
memo. He didn't research anything I asked him to research" (R. 145:68). However,
instead of addressing inaccuracies in his criminal record, defendant challenged the
report's factual summary of his current crime (Id). The trial court interrupted defendant
and ordered him not to "argue the case with me, Mr. Weaver. I want to know about your
life" (Id.).
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Defendant then explained that he had two young children and that, "since three
years ago when I accepted custody of my kids, I changed my whole life. I mean, I gave
up everything" (R. 145:68). The trial court interrupted defendant and asked, "What are
these charges in Salt Lake County from last year? . . . If you changed your life, what are
those doing there?" (Id). The court then referenced the charges pending at the time the
PSI was prepared, as well as an assault and an "attempted damaging a jail" charge (R.
145:69). Defendant responded, "Well, Your Honor, when I lost custody of my kids [when
I was arrested for the current crime], that was the rock that held me together. .. . After
six months, I lost myself for a minute" (R. 145:68). The court then asked defendant the
status of the charges he had pending in Salt Lake County (R. 145:71). After hearing
defendant's response, the court heard from the prosecutor and the victim (R. 145:72-73).
When the court then asked defense counsel whether there was anything farther, the
following discussion took place:
Defco:

He's just disputing the entire adult record on Page 4.

Court:

All I'm interested in, Mr. Weaver, is you've been to prison twice,
right?

Defendant:

Your Honor, I've been to prison more than twice.

Court:

I know, at least twice, right?

Defendant:

Yes sir.

Court:

You've been paroled a couple of times and revoked?

Defendant:

Yes sir, 13 years ago.

Court:

And I note that that's been 15 years since that occurred.

(R. 145:74-75).
Without any further discussion of the alleged inaccuracies in defendant's PSI, the
trial court sentenced defendant to a suspended prison term, placed him on probation, and
ordered him to pay restitution (R. 145:75). As a condition of probation, defendant was
ordered to serve 90 days in jail with "[n]o credit for time served" (R. 80, 95-96, 100-03).
The court explained, "the reason I impose this sentence at this time is because of what
you have done in the interim period since this offense occurred. Now if I were sentencing
you on the Salt Lake matters, I'll tell you right now, you'd go right to prison but that's not
before m e . . . . " (R. 145:77).
On May 18, 2006, defendant filed his notice of appeal (R. 85-86). The trial court
entered its final judgment on May 22, 2006 (R. 100-03).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Issue I, Defendant claims that the trial court erred in sentencing him before
resolving his objections to his PSI. Defendant contends that, absent this error, the trial
court would not have sentenced him to 90 days in jail. Defendant, therefore, asks this
Court to vacate his sentence and remand the matter to the trial court for resolution of
those objections and resentencing.
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Under well-established law, the trial court was required to resolve defendant's
objections to his PSI at sentencing. Because the trial court failed to do so, a remand for
that purpose is necessary.
However, the record clearly establishes that defendant's sentence was not based on
any discrepancies in defendant's PSI. Moreover, any challenge to defendant's 90-day jail
term is moot where defendant has apparently served that sentence. Consequently, this
Court should reject defendant's request to vacate his sentence.
Issue II. Defendant claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance at
sentencing by failing to have the trial court resolve any alleged discrepancies in his PSI
and by failing to assert three mitigating factors. To establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, defendant must show both that his counsel performed deficiently and that he was
prejudiced by counsel's performance.
Defendant's first claim fails because, as discussed in Point I, none of the alleged
inaccuracies in his PSI affected defendant's sentence. Thus, defendant cannot show that
he was prejudiced by counsel's performance, even if it were deficient.
Defendant's second claim fails because he cannot overcome the presumption that
counsel's decision not to argue the mitigating factors was a sound strategic one.
Defendant had a long criminal record that spanned thirty years and included numerous
convictions for theft. In addition, defendant had accumulated several charges, including
an assault charge, after being charged in the present case. Against that background, any

8

attempt to minimize defendant's culpability in this particular case—by asserting that his
conduct here "neither caused nor threatened serious harm" and that the offensive conduct
in this case was "from a single episode,"—could have easily backfired, causing the court
to focus even more on defendant's extensive criminal history of thefts and burglaries than
it already had. More importantly, defendant received a suspended prison term and a
probation term that required only 90 days in jail. Given his extensive criminal history,
defendant cannot show that, absent his counsel's performance, he would have received a
more favorable sentence.
ARGUMENT
L

THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR THE TRIAL COURT
TO RESOLVE ON THE RECORD DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS
TO HIS PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in sentencing him without first "duly

considering] the inaccuracies set forth in the Presentence Investigation Report." Aplt.
Br. at 10. According to defendant, at sentencing, he disputed "among other things, the
entire adult record." Id. However, the trial court "failed to duly consider the information
or make findings on the record as to whether the information objected to . . . was
accurate," and "failed to make the requisite determination on the record of whether the
information was relevant to the issue at sentencing." Id. at 11. The State concedes that a
limited remand is necessary for the trial court to resolve defendant's objections to his
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adult criminal record as reported in the PSI. Defendant's sentence, however, should be
affirmed.
Governing law. Section 77-18-1(6) governs disputes in presentence investigation
reports. Under that section, "[a]ny alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to
sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge." Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-18-l(6)(a) (West 2004). If the parties are thereafter unable to resolve those
inaccuracies, the trial court "shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the
record." Id "[Compliance with this section 'requires the sentencing judge to consider
the party's objections to the report, make findings on the record as to whether the
information objected to is accurate, and determine on the record whether that information
is relevant to the issue of sentencing."5 State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35,133, 999 P.2d 7
(quoting State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ^ 44, 973 P.2d 404); see also State v. Veteto, 2000
UT 62, \ 14, 6 P.3d 1133; State v. Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, % 26, 94 P.3d 295.
A violation of section 77-18-l(6)(a) requires a remand "to the trial court with
instructions that it expressly resolve [defendant's] objections in full compliance with
section 77-18-l(6)(a)." Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, \ 45; see also Maroney, 2004 UT App 206,

1J31.
Few violations of section 77-18-l(6)(a), however, require vacation of defendant's
sentence. If the alleged inaccuracies had no impact on a sentence, this Court affirms the
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sentence and remands the matter "for the limited purpose of resolving [defendant's]
objections to the presentence investigation report on the record as required by section 7718-l(6)(a)." Veteto, 2000 UT 62, <h 16; Kohl, 2000 UT 35,ffif34-35 (remanding for
findings under section 77-18-1(6) but affirming sentence); Jaegar, 1999 UT 1, U 45
(holding that, where defendant does not claim that trial court's error "affected his
sentence, this error does not require reversal" of defendant's sentence); State v. Toles,
2006 UT App 359U (memorandum decision) (per curiam) (affirming sentence where,
"[fjrom all that appears in the record, the alleged inaccuracies had no effect on the court's
determination that prison was the appropriate sentence"); State v. Villalobos, 2000 UT
App 354U (memorandum decision) (affirming sentence where disputed facts "would not
affect [defendant's] sentence").
Even if defendant challenges his sentence and the record is unclear as to whether
the alleged inaccuracies affected it, this Court still does not vacate the sentence. Rather,
this Court remands the matter to the trial court to "resolve [defendant's] objections on the
record," and directs the court that, "[i]f resolution of the objections affects the trial court's
view of the appropriate sentence, the trial court may .. . revise the sentence accordingly."
Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, \3\\see

also State v. Reddish, 2006 UT App 376U, * 1

(memorandum decision) (per curiam) (same); State v. Hernandez, 2005 UT App 476U, *1
(memorandum decision) (per curiam) (same).
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Analysis. In this case, the trial court did not resolve defendant's objections as
required under section 77-18-l(6)(a) (R. 145:68-77). Consequently, this Court should
remand the matter for the trial court to resolve those objections. See Utah Code Ann. §
77-18-l(6)(a); Veteto, 2000 UT 62,116; Kohl, 2000 UT 35,ffif34-35; Jaeger, 1999 UT
1,145; Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, ^ 31.
This Court should not, however, vacate defendant's sentence. First, defendant
makes no showing that the alleged inaccuracies in the PSI affected his sentence. See
Aplt. Br. at 9-11. Nor can he.
Defendant contends that, before the trial court, he disputed "among other things,
the entire adult record." Aplt. Br. at 10. However, to the extent the trial court considered
defendant's prior record at sentencing, the court expressly confirmed with defendant the
accuracy of those parts of his record which it found relevant. Thus, the court confirmed
with defendant that "you've been to prison [at least] twice, right?" (R. 145:74-75). The
court also confirmed with defendant that "[y]ou've been paroled a couple of times and
revoked?" (Id.). And, the court confirmed that defendant committed additional crimes
even after he had committed the present offense (R. 145:68-69). Finally, in explaining
the basis for its lenient sentence, the trial court did not reference defendant's prior
criminal record; rather, the court explained, "[t]he reason I impose this sentence at this
time is because of what you have done in the interim period since this offense occurred"
(R. 145:77).
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Given this record, defendant cannot show that the alleged inaccuracies in his PSI
affected his sentence. Cf. Toles, 2006 UT App 359U (affirming sentence where "[fjrom
all that appears in the record, the alleged inaccuracies had no effect on the court's
determination that prison was the appropriate sentence"); Villalobos, 2000 UT App 354U
(affirming sentence where disputed facts "would not affect [defendant's] sentence").
Second, even if the alleged inaccuracies did adversely affect his sentence, the only
part of his sentence which defendant claims was affected was his jail term, a condition of
his probation. According to defendant, absent the alleged inaccuracies in his PSI, "the
court arguably would have simply imposed probation," without the "90 days jail time."
Aplt. Br. at 15 (discussing prejudice in connection with his ineffective assistance claim).
However, the trial court imposed sentence on defendant on May 9, 2006, and
ordered defendant to begin serving that jail term immediately. Nothing in the record
suggests that defendant requested a stay of execution of the jail term pending appeal.
Consequently, defendant has long served that part of his sentence which he asserts was
affected by the alleged inaccuracies in the PSI. Any challenge to that part of his sentence
is, therefore, moot. See State v. Davis, 721 P.2d 894, 895 (Utah 1986) ("[H]owever
questionable the procedures employed in entering the formal order of sentence, the matter
is now moot since defendant has served his sentence and has received a formal
termination of probation."); Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1981) (holding that
challenge to sentence was moot "where it can be shown that no adverse collateral
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consequences will follow a failure to rule on a . . . challenge to a sentence now served");
Salt Lake City v. Woitock, 1999 UT App 341U, *1 (memorandum decision) (per curiam)
(holding that challenge to sentence on class B misdemeanor was moot where defendant
"did not seek a stay of his sentence pending this appeal").
In sum, the trial court's failure to resolve on the record defendant's objections to
his PSI requires that this case be remanded to the trial court only for that limited purpose.
The trial court's failure does not require vacation of defendant's sentence.
II.

DEFENDANT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT SENTENCING, WHERE HE HAS
NOT SHOWN THAT COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE NEGATIVELY
AFFECTED HIS SENTENCE
Defendant claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing.

Defendant asserts, first, that counsel performed deficiently by "fail[ing] to investigate the
inaccuracies in the PSI" or to ask the trial court to "utilize its fact finding function to
resolve [them]." Aplt. Br. at 13. Defendant asserts, second, that counsel performed
deficiently by "fail[ing] to argue various mitigating circumstances." Id. at 14. Defendant
argues that, absent counsel's deficient performance, "the court arguably would have
simply imposed probation," without also imposing "90 days jail time." Id. at 15.
A.

Governing law.

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must demonstrate both
that "counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgement," and that "counsel's deficient performance was
14

prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT
76, If 19,12 P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)).
To establish the first prong of the Strickland test, defendant must "rebut the strong
presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered
sound trial strategy." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, If 19 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). To establish the second prong, defendant must affirmatively show that
absent counsel's acts or omissions, there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable
result. See State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) (holding that claim of prejudice
must be "demonstrable reality and not a speculative matter") (citation and quotation
marks omitted); State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996).
In both instances, "defendant bears the burden of assuring the record is adequate."
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 16. "The necessary consequence of this burden is that an
appellate court will presume that any argument of ineffectiveness presented to it is
supported by all the relevant evidence of which defendant is aware." Id. at ^f 17. "Where
the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting
therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed
effectively." Id.
Finally, "it is not necessary for [this Court] 'to address both components of the
[Strickland] inquiry if [defendant] makes an insufficient showing on one.'" Parsons v.
Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 523 (Utah 1994) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697); see also
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State v. Wright, 2004 UT App 102, \ 9, 90 P.3d 644. Thus, "[w]hen it is 'easier to
dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,'5' this
Court "will do so without addressing whether counsel's performance was professionally
reasonable." Parsons, 871 P.2d at 523 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697); see also
Wright, 2004 UT App 102, lj 9.
B.

Defense counsel's failure to object to inaccuracies in PSI.

Defendant claims that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance at sentencing by
failing to address alleged inaccuracies in his PSI, including the "aggravating
circumstances listed in the PSI." Aplt. Br. at 13-14. However, as demonstrated in Point I,
none of the alleged inaccuracies in defendant's PSI affected his sentence. See pp. 12-13,
supra. Thus, even if defense counsel performed deficiently by not adequately addressing
the alleged inaccuracies, defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's performance.
Defendant's ineffectiveness claim therefore fails. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 19;
Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50; Arguelles, 921 P.2d at 441; Parsons, 871 P.2d at 523; Wright,
2004 UT App 102,1(9.
C.

Defense counsel's failure to assert mitigating circumstances.

Defendant claims that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance at sentencing by
"failpng] to argue various mitigating circumstances." Aplt. Br. at 14. Specifically,
defendant claims that counsel should have argued as mitigating factors that his "'criminal
conduct neither caused nor threatened serious harm,'" that "'[t]here were substantial
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grounds to excuse or justify criminal behavior, though failing to establish a defense,'" and
that "the offensive conduct was 'from a single criminal episode.5" Aplt. Br. at 14-15
(quoting R. 143, p.2).
Defendant, however, presents no evidence indicating that "there were substantial
grounds to excuse or justify [his] criminal behavior" in this case. See Aplt. Br. at 14
(quoting R. 143). Thus, defendant cannot rely on that mitigating factor to support his
ineffective assistance claim. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 17 (holding that "[w]here the
record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom
simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively.")
Second, defendant fails to "rebut the strong presumption that under the
circumstances," counsel's decision not to raise the other two mitigating factors "might be
considered sound trial strategy." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^f 19 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). According to his PSI, defendant's criminal history spans some
thirty years and includes numerous convictions on theft and burglary charges (R. 133-35).
In addition, defendant confirmed at sentencing that he had a pending assault charge (R.
145:69).
Against that backdrop, any assertion that defendant should be shown leniency in
this particular case because his "'criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious
harm'" or because "the offensive conduct was 'from a single crimmal episode'"—even
though defendant's record revealed a long history of single criminal episodes—would
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have rung hollow at best. At worst, it would have drawn the court's attention back to
defendant's long criminal history, his apparent unwillingness to learn from his prior
criminal penalties, and the PSPs recommendation that defendant be sentenced to prison
based on that history (R. 130-31). Under such circumstances, defense counsel may have
reasonably concluded that assertion of the mitigating factors was as likely to hurt
defendant as to help him. Counsel's decision not to pursue them, therefore, may certainly
"be considered sound trial strategy." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^f 19 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Finally, even if defendant could show that his counsel rendered deficient
performance in not asserting these mitigating factors, defendant has not shown that he
was prejudiced by counsel's performance. Defendant's only contention is that, absent
counsel's errors, "the court arguably would have simply imposed probation," without also
imposing "90 days jail time." Aplt. Br. at 15. The record at sentencing, however, makes
clear that the trial court's sentencing decision was primarily based on defendant's
criminal history, not on the nature of the current offense (R. 145:74-75, 77). Thus,
defendant's contention that, absent counsel's alleged deficiency, he would have received
any more lenient sentence than the one he actually received, is pure speculation. See
Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50 (holding that claim of prejudice must be "demonstrable reality
and not a speculative matter") (citation and quotation marks omitted).
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In sum, defendant's claim that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance at
sentencing fails.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully asks this Court to affirm defendant's
sentence and to remand this matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of resolving
defendant's objections to his PSI in compliance with section 77-18-l(6)(a).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED j£_ April 2007.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

KAREN A. KLUCZNIK J
Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum A

Addendum A

§ 76-6-404.

Theft—Elements

A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.

§ 77-18-1. Suspension of sentence—Pleas held in abeyance—Probation—Supervision—Presentence investigation—Standards—Confidentiality—Terms
and conditions—Termination, revocation, modification, or extension—
Hearings—Electronic monitoring
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with a plea in
abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided in Title 77, Chapter
2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement
(2)(a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of any crime or
offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence and
place the defendant on probation. The court may place the defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in
cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.
(b)(i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the department is
with the department.
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court
is vested as ordered by the court.
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(3)(a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards
for all individuals referred to the department. These standards shall be based on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the demand for services;
(iii) the availability of agency resources;
(iv) the public safety; and
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level of services
shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial
Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for review and comment
prior to adoption by the department.
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to implement the
supervision and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications to the
standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and other criteria as they consider
appropriate.
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact report and
submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee.
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to supervise
the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions or to conduct
presentence investigation reports on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the
department may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with
department standards.
(5)(a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of the
defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of time for
the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report from the department or information from other sources about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the effect of the crime on the victim
and the victim's family.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary
damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding the payment
of restitution with interest by the defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a,
Crime Victims Restitution Act.
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any diagnostic
evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, are protected and are not
available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the
Judicial Council or for use by the department.
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(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the defendant's
attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and the court for
review, three working days prior to sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence
investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to
sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may
grant an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the
department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall
make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the record.
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at
the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or information
the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate
sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall be presented in open court on record
and in the presence of the defendant.
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may require that the
defendant:
(a) perform any or all of the following:
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being placed on
probation;
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs;
(in) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally liable;
(iv) participate in available treatment programs, including any treatment program in
which the defendant is currently participating, if the program is acceptable to the court;
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a' county jail designated by the
department, after considering any recommendation by the court as to which jail the court
finds most appropriate;
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of electronic
monitoring;
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7;
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services;
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest in accordance
with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; and
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate; and
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997:
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a GED
certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's own expense if the defendant has
not received the diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being placed
on probation; or
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items listed in
Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of:
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or
(B) other justified cause.
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as defined by Section
76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during:
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with Subsection
77-27-6(4); and
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised probation and
any extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection (10).
(10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or upon
completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases,
or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions.
(ii)(A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under Subsection
(10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account receivable as defined in
Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the
defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the
account receivable.

(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the registry of civil
judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and immediately transfer responsibility to collect the account to the Office of State Debt Collection,
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, or upon its
own motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his failure to pay
should not be treated as contempt of court
(b)(i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State Debt
Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination
of supervised probation will occur by law.
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report of
details on outstanding accounts receivable.
(ll)(a)(i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having been
charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke probation does not
constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term
unless the probationer is exonerated at the hearing,
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation report with
the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the issuance
of an order to show cause or warrant by the court.
(12)(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing by
the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the probationer has violated the
conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that
the conditions of probation have been violated.
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to constitute
violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized probation shall determine
if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or
extension of probation is justified.
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on the
defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order to show cause
why his probation should not be revoked, modified, or extended.
(c)(i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing and shall be
served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be represented^
by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if he is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present evidence.
(d)(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of the affidavit
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney
shall present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are
based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant unless the
court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and present
evidence.
(e)(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court
may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire probation term
commence anew.

(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of the Division of
Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a condition
of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or
his designee has certified to the court that:
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the state hospital;
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for treatment
over the defendants described in this Subsection (13).
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic evaluations, are
classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and
Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records
Committee may not order the disclosure of a presentence investigation report Except for
disclosure at the time of sentencing pursuant to this section,_ the department may disclose the
presentence investigation only when:
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7);
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the department
for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of the offender;
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole;
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the subject's
authorized representative; or
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence investigation report
or the victim's authorized representative, provided that the disclosure to the victim shall
include only information relating to statements or materials provided by the victim, to the
circumstances of the crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the
crime on the victim or the victim's household.
(15)(a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation under the
supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5.
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home confinement,
including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to the department in accordance
with Subsection (16).
(16)(a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it may order the
defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring as
described in this section until further order of the court.
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate law
enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts.
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require:
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; and
(li) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the defendant's
compliance with the court's order may be monitored.
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement through electronic
monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, it shall:
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Department of
Corrections;
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the defendant
and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the defendant; and
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confinement to the
department or the program provider.
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to be indigent by the court.
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this section either
directly or by contract with a private provider.

